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ABSTRACT—This Article uncovers and names a phenomenon of pressing 
importance for healthcare policy and religious liberty law: the rise of zombie 
religious institutions—organizations that have contractual commitments to 
religious identity but lack actual attachments to churches or associations of 
religious people. Contracts create religion—sometimes in perpetuity—for 
institutions that are not, or never have been, religious and for providers who 
do not share the institution’s religious precepts. This Article details religion’s 
spread across healthcare through affiliations, mergers, and—most 
surprisingly—sales of hospitals that continue religious practice after their 
connection to a church ends. These contracts require hospitals—secular and 
religious, public and private, for-profit and nonprofit—to comply with 
religious tenets. “Religious” institutions far removed from the paradigm of 
the church populate the marketplace. In this way, private law impedes public 
policy, expanding the universe of institutions eligible for religious 
exemption from otherwise applicable laws. Moreover, as the category of 
religious institution loses its specialness, theories of religious 
institutionalism founder. The presumption of autonomy of religious 
institutions from regulation cannot survive in the marketplace where 
religious identity can be bought and sold. 
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INTRODUCTION 
West Suburban Hospital is a zombie religious institution. It does not 
unite a community of religious people. It is disconnected from any church. 
Located in Oak Park, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, West Suburban was an 
independent community hospital when Catholic Resurrection Health sought 
to purchase it in 2004.1 Its medical staff did not share the Catholic values of 
the buyer; indeed, they opposed religious restrictions on their treatment of 
patients. The sale, however, ultimately went through.2 West Suburban 
became Catholic. Just five years later, West Suburban was sold to a for-profit 
investor. By the terms of the sale, the now-for-profit hospital will not be 
listed as Catholic and must remove crucifixes and religious art.3 Nonetheless, 
it remains obligated to prohibit the performance of abortions and 
sterilizations.4 Based on five years of Catholic ownership in its almost 100-
year history, West Suburban became perpetually bound to Catholic 
restrictions.5 By contract, this previously secular institution became 
religious. Once sold, the religious institution survived in zombie form—
 
 1 Marty Stempniak, West Sub Sold to MacNeal Owner, OAKPARK.COM (published Nov. 24, 2009, 
2:06 PM; updated Dec. 1, 2009, 10:10 PM), http://www.oakpark.com/News/Articles/12-1-2009/West-
Sub-sold-to-MacNeal-owner [https://perma.cc/6E3Q-PDE5]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Edwin Yohnka, A Bad Deal for Health Care in Illinois, HUFFINGTON POST (published May 20, 
2010, 6:42 PM; updated May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edwin-yohnka/a-bad-deal-for-
health-car_b_584000.html [https://perma.cc/F3LG-79PB]. 
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lacking a live connection to religion but contractually committed to religious 
identity. 
Zombie religious institutions have emerged at a moment when law and 
theory have taken a distinctly institutional turn. This new religious 
institutionalism places institutions—not individuals—at the core of religious 
liberty and grants them a special status in the social order.6 The doctrinal 
high-water mark is the 2012 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& School v. EEOC decision, in which the Supreme Court carved out a 
constitutional sphere of substantial autonomy from regulation for religious 
institutions through a doctrine known as the ministerial exception.7 
Encouraged by Hosanna-Tabor, a number of legal scholars advocate 
granting near-absolute immunity from governmental regulation to 
churches—defined to encompass at least some commercial entities.8 
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. shed additional light on this problem.9 In a challenge to the Affordable 
Care Act’s mandate that insurance plans cover contraception, the Supreme 
Court held that closely held for-profit corporations could promote religion 
like nonprofit religious organizations and were equally entitled to religious 
accommodation.10 Ascribing religion to the for-profit corporation—that is, a 
nexus of contracts11¾the Court’s decision further raised the stakes for 
religious institutionalism.12 
 
 6 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the 
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 293 (2008) (“[A]n appropriately institutional approach to the 
Religion Clauses would involve attention to the religious-freedom rights of religious entities . . . .”). 
 7 565 U.S. 171, 179, 188 (2012) (holding that religious institutions need not comply with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act with regard to employees who are “ministers”). 
 8 See generally Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 59, 59–60 (2013); John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 
21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335, 338 (2013); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of 
the Church?, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 249, 249–50 
(Austin Sarat ed., 2012). For responses, see Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the 
Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 146 (2013), and Richard C. Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
15, 16 (2013). 
 9 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014). 
 10 Id. at 2759. 
 11 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (setting out this theory 
of the firm); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (discussing 
corporation as nexus of contracts). 
 12 Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 769, 778 (2015) (observing that “tensions between religious exercise and commercial objectives 
stand at the center of some of the most foundational church-state debates in the United States”); Nathan 
B. Oman, The Need for a Law of Church and Market, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 141, 143 (2015) (“[W]e lack 
a clear set of theories and metaphors specifying what role, if any, religion should play in commerce.”). 
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Using healthcare as its case study, this Article argues that when religion 
and commerce combine, commercial transactions shape religious 
compliance and identity. As religious identity spreads through contract, 
“religious” institutions far removed from the paradigm of the church 
populate the marketplace. Secular, for-profit, and government institutions 
can become religious and eligible for legislative and judicial exemptions 
from regulation. This contracting of religion—the rise of zombie religious 
institutions in particular—exposes the weakness in the theory of religious 
institutionalism, which would allow institutions the authority to define their 
boundaries and the autonomy to avoid state regulation. As ever-wider 
categories of institutions become eligible for exemption, the concept of a 
religious institution comes under strain. 
Part I of the Article describes an important phenomenon: private law 
has worked to create religious compliance—sometimes in perpetuity—in 
facilities that are not, or never have been, religious and by providers who do 
not share the institution’s religious precepts. This Article looks to the 
experience of healthcare because the religious hospital has long served as the 
exemplar of the religious institution flourishing in commerce.13 Through 
contract, healthcare facilities identified as secular, affiliated with other faiths, 
or operated as public hospitals assume new religious obligations and 
privileges. Healthcare systems with names like “Optima” and hospitals with 
names like “Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital” come to require providers’ 
obedience to religious doctrine.14 Distinctions between secular and religious, 
public and private, and nonprofit and for-profit no longer hold. 
 
 13 Helen M. Alvaré, Religious Freedom Versus Sexual Expression: A Guide, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 
475, 483, 485–86 (2015) (discussing hospitals as exemplars of Catholic religious institutions and 
ministry); Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion Make a 
Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 824 (“Although it is somewhat difficult to say what gives a 
collective entity an objection in conscience, we do understand that a hospital that is run by a religious 
group has a powerful reason not to allow actions on its premises that the religion regards as murder or as 
another serious moral wrong.”); Ana Smith Iltis, Institutional Integrity in Roman Catholic Health Care 
Institutions, 7 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 95, 98–102 (2001) (addressing concerns about integrity of Catholic 
healthcare institutions as they face the challenges of a secular, pluralistic, market-driven economy); Roger 
Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 939, 964 (2007) (listing hospitals as among “religious institutions [that] have enjoyed wide latitude 
in choosing which religiously motivated services and facilities to provide and to whom they will be 
provided”); Susan J. Stabile, When Conscience Clashes with State Law and Policy: Catholic Institutions, 
46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 137, 144 (2017) (“[W]hen a Catholic organization cares for the elderly or the 
sick, or provides for education, it is performing an act as religious as those that take place inside a church 
building.”). 
 14 RELIAS, Health System Bans Abortions in Facilities, MED. ETHICS ADVISOR (Apr. 1, 1998), 
https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/59254-health-system-bans-abortions-in-facilities 
[https://perma.cc/29F4-LDZN] (reporting that, following the merger of Catholic Medical Center and 
Elliot Hospital into Optima Healthcare, abortion was prohibited at both facilities); see also Brownfield v. 
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The expansion of religious restrictions and identity is not limited to 
ongoing relationships between religious and secular institutions. By the 
terms of their sales, formerly religious hospitals maintain a religious identity. 
In other instances, hospitals lose their religious affiliation after sale but 
continue their compliance with religious rules. Zombie religious hospitals—
removed of the leadership or mission that might have given them special 
status as religious institutions—carry on. 
Part II contends that private law impedes public policy by expanding 
the universe of institutions eligible for religious exemption from law. The 
growing number of institutions adopting religious identity belies a 
fundamental assumption of legislative and judicial exemptions: that religious 
objections will not be so numerous or categorical as to thwart the state’s 
goals. To the extent that contracts of religious compliance demand behavior 
below standards set by generally applicable laws, they do not promote 
corporate social responsibility but instead effectively immunize secular, for-
profit, and government institutions from employee and consumer 
protections. 
Part III argues that the combination of commerce and religion 
destabilizes the theory of religious institutionalism that seemed triumphant 
after Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby. Religious institutionalists ground 
their claims to broad institutional autonomy from regulation on values of 
pluralism and voluntarism. According to this view, robust institutional 
protection leads to the flourishing of diverse institutions, alternative sources 
of authority, and individual liberty. But in the marketplace, powerful 
economic entities may reduce pluralism, both religious and secular. 
Institutions gain faith through commercial transaction instead of organic 
development. They unite individuals through contract, not devotion. In this 
way, the healthcare market realizes fears articulated by several courts in the 
1980s that, having been granted religious exemptions, religious institutions 
might “extend their influence and propagate their faith by entering the 
commercial, profit-making world.”15 
Contracting religion—and the zombie institutions it generates—makes 
the crisis acute. As religious institutions blur the lines between for-profit and 
nonprofit, commercial and noncommercial, and sacred and secular, the 
category of religious institution loses its specialness. Any institution can 
 
Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (considering claim by rape 
victim against Catholic hospital for denying emergency contraception and counseling). 
 15 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 337 (1987) (dismissing this concern of the district court); see also King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 
498 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that Title VII’s religious employer exemption “is a sure formula 
for concentrating and vastly extending the worldly influence of those religious sects having the wealth 
and inclination to buy up pieces of the secular economy”). 
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become religious. Under such circumstances, courts may replace their hands-
off approach to religious identity and doctrine with more searching and 
skeptical analysis. Legislatures may revisit and rethink the enterprise of 
institutional exemption. In so doing, they may reduce the liberty that the 
doctrine grants to religious institutions and perhaps to religious exercise 
more broadly. 
I. THE MARKET FOR RELIGIOUS COMPLIANCE AND IDENTITY 
This Part argues that commercial transactions are creating religious 
institutions far removed from the paradigm of church or religious 
association. This account focuses on healthcare, due to the degree to which 
the sector has combined religion and commerce, and on Catholic healthcare 
in particular, due to its large market share and extensive religious 
requirements. It illuminates three orders of institutions: original religious 
institutions, contracting partners or affiliates, and zombie religious 
institutions. While churches are uncontestably first-order institutions, 
officially designated religious nonprofit hospitals have long been considered 
exemplars of religious institutionalism. As Section I.A describes, these 
original institutions themselves have changed in commerce and have become 
largely indistinguishable from their secular competitors. Further along the 
spectrum, as Section I.B shows, we find contracting partners engaged in a 
variety of ongoing relationships with religious institutions. Mergers, joint 
ventures, and partnerships commit institutions that are public, secular, or 
affiliated with other faiths to comply with Catholic doctrine. Finally, as 
Section I.C argues, provisions in sales contracts and restrictive covenants in 
deeds perpetuate religious identity in formerly Catholic facilities long after 
ownership has changed. Zombie religious institutions emerge, even as the 
justifications for religious identity—the affiliation with a religious body or 
the religious beliefs of founders, directors, or employees—no longer remain. 
A. Evolution of Catholic Healthcare Institutions 
The healthcare landscape includes many faith traditions, including 
Orthodox Jewish nursing homes, Christian Science centers, Presbyterian 
hospitals, and more. Catholic healthcare, however, dwarfs all other religious 
healthcare providers combined. In a market where approximately 59% of 
hospitals are nonprofit, Catholic healthcare systems are four of the ten largest 
nonprofit systems.16 There are 548 officially designated Catholic hospitals, 
 
 16 LOIS UTTLEY & CHRISTINE KHAIKIN, MERGERWATCH, GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND 
HEALTH SYSTEMS: 2016 UPDATE OF THE MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE REPORT 2, 8 (2016), 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/816571/27061007/1465224862580/M [https://perma.cc/DDK4-
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which constitute approximately 14.5% of the national market17 but over 40% 
of acute care beds in five states and over 30% in five other states.18 
Officially designated Catholic hospitals have a sponsoring religious 
order and identify as an extension of the Church.19 They require governance 
and provision of care in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives 
for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs).20 According to these directives, a 
Catholic institution must “distinguish itself by service” to those in need, act 
as “a responsible steward of the health care resources available to it,” and 
“treat its employees respectfully and justly,” including through “just 
compensation and benefits” and “recognition of the rights of employees to 
organize and bargain collectively without prejudice to the common good.”21 
Within Catholic healthcare facilities, all providers must comply with 
religious restrictions on care.22 Assisted reproductive technology, abortion, 
contraception, condoms, sterilization, and treatments derived from fetal 
tissue or embryonic stem cells are not permitted.23 Under the ERDs, patients 
may only be informed of “morally legitimate alternatives.”24 And where 
patients have made a decision about the use or withdrawal of artificial life 
support, their wishes will not be honored if they are contrary to Catholic 
teaching.25 
These modern Catholic healthcare facilities are frequently considered 
first-order religious institutions, not unlike churches or church-run charities. 
Today, however, they bear little resemblance to such noncommercial 
religious entities. In the early days of Catholic healthcare, women religious 
provided nursing care and served as administrators, overseeing daily 
 
HMUB]. Catholic healthcare has 1600 long-term and other health facilities. About CHA, CATHOLIC 
HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., https://www.chausa.org/about [https://perma.cc/33TK-RVE3]. 
 17 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 16, at 1, 3. 
 18 Id. at 1. 
 19 See J. Stuart Showalter & John L. Miles, Restructuring Health Care Organizations While 
Retaining Recognition as a Catholic Institution, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1111, 1125–26, 1131 (1988). 
 20 See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR 
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (5th ed. 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-
and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-
edition-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM2L-WL4X] [hereinafter ERDs]. 
 21 Id. at 11–12 (ERDs 1, 3, 6, and 7). 
 22 Id. at 12 (“Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives as policy [and] require 
adherence to them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and employment . . . .”). 
 23 See id. at 25–27, 33 (ERDs 38-41, 45, 48, 52, 53, and 66). 
 24 Id. at 20 (ERD 27). 
 25 See id. at 31 (“The free and informed judgment made by a competent adult patient concerning the 
use or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures should always be respected and normally complied with, 
unless it is contrary to Catholic moral teaching.”). With regard to artificial nutrition and hydration, the 
ERDs impose “an obligation to provide patients with food and water,” even when they are in “chronic 
and presumably irreversible conditions.” Id. (ERD 58). 
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operations.26 Hospitals would operate as charities, providing care to the poor 
and securing financing from private donations.27 Over the course of the last 
century, this model of religious healthcare institution—owned, operated, and 
directed by women religious—disappeared. 
By the mid-twentieth century, with scientific advances in antisepsis and 
new funding from private health insurance and federal financing, Catholic 
healthcare institutions no longer primarily served charity patients or 
depended on donations.28 The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 
cemented these changes.29 Today, virtually all funding of Catholic healthcare 
comes from government funds and private insurers.30 In terms of 
sophistication of care, competition over prices, and levels of charitable care, 
Catholic hospitals resemble their secular nonprofit and for-profit 
competitors.31 
As vocations of women religious declined, the staffing and governance 
of Catholic healthcare also evolved. Members of religious orders came to 
have little to no patient interaction and to sponsor “systems in markets in 
which they no longer have—or never did have—an active presence.”32 
Hospitals that had existed as parts of their sponsoring religious organizations 
 
 26 See Barbra Mann Wall, The Role of Catholic Nurses in Women’s Health Care Policy Disputes: A 
Historical Study, 61 NURSING OUTLOOK 367, 368 (2013) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of Catholic 
hospitals in America were established and originally managed by women.”). 
 27 See BARBRA MANN WALL, AMERICAN CATHOLIC HOSPITALS: A CENTURY OF CHANGING 
MARKETS AND MISSIONS 9 (2011). 
 28 See Showalter & Miles, supra note 19, at 1117–19. 
 29 See Donald H.J. Hermann, Religiously Affiliated Health Care Providers: Legal Structures and 
Transformations, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 727, 727 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006). 
 30 LOIS UTTLEY & RONNIE PAWELKO, MERGERWATCH, NO STRINGS ATTACHED: PUBLIC FUNDING 
OF RELIGIOUSLY-SPONSORED HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 15 (2002), 
http://www.mergerwatch.org/storage/pdf-files/bp_no_strings.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET8E-V9P6] 
(finding that in one representative state, charitable donations amounted to 0.0015% of revenue for 
religious hospitals). 
 31 See, e.g., CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
1 (Jan. 2013), https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/mini_profile-pdf 
[https://perma.cc/99Z2-H2XW] (showing a similar service mix at Catholic and other nonprofit hospitals 
with the exception of a few services, including palliative care, that are more common in Catholic 
hospitals); LOIS UTTLEY ET AL., MERGERWATCH & ACLU, MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE: THE GROWTH 
OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE 12–13 (Dec. 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P529-Q2TW] (reporting that Catholic-sponsored and -affiliated hospitals provide 
disproportionately less charity care than do public hospitals and other religious nonprofit hospitals and 
less care for Medicaid patients than any other type of hospital); Ann Kutney-Lee et al., Distinct Enough? 
A National Examination of Catholic Hospital Affiliation and Patient Perceptions of Care, 39 HEALTH 
CARE MGMT. REV. 134, 134 (2014) (reporting that “patients treated in Catholic hospitals appear to rate 
their hospital experience similar to patients treated in non-Catholic hospitals”). 
 32 Lawrence E. Singer, Does Mission Matter?, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 347, 348 (2006). 
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formed separate corporate entities.33 Laypeople became directors and 
administrators of these hospitals.34 
In the absence of shared religious ties to personnel, formal mechanisms 
of control were put in place. In Catholic hospital structures, the religious 
orders frequently remained members of the nonprofit corporation and 
retained authority over fundamental corporate changes¾including anything 
affecting religious mission¾but boards of directors exercised general 
governance authority and oversight.35 Local bishops assumed a greater role 
in supervising healthcare institutions and policing compliance with the ERDs 
in response (at least partly) to the lack of religious administrators and staff.36 
B. Spread of Religion to Non-Catholic Healthcare 
Over the past few decades, Catholic healthcare systems have increased 
in size and scope by acquiring, affiliating with, and merging with non-
Catholic hospitals and other facilities.37 Whereas Catholic hospitals merged 
with one another in the 1980s, they became willing to deal with non-Catholic 
hospitals as a new wave of consolidation swept the nation in the 1990s.38 
Over the course of that decade, 171 mergers (and many affiliations) took 
place between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals.39 After its enactment in 
2010, the Affordable Care Act fueled another frenzy of consolidation.40 
These commercial transactions have blurred the lines between religious 
and nonreligious entities. In a merger or acquisition, the Catholic and non-
Catholic hospitals become a single entity.41 This entity may or may not be 
 
 33 Michael J. DeBoer, Religious Hospitals and the Federal Community Benefit Standard—Counting 
Religious Purpose as a Tax-Exemption Factor for Hospitals, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1549, 1565–66 
(2012). 
 34 WALL, supra note 27, at 5. 
 35 DeBoer, supra note 33, at 1566. 
 36 Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. LEGIS. 69, 124 (2004). 
 37 UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 4 (documenting mergers from 2001 to 2011); WALL, supra note 
27, at 19 (discussing the merger trend of the 1990s); Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious 
Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1995) (“Although the 
1980s witnessed many mergers among Catholic facilities, the realities of the 1990s have necessitated the 
consolidation of Catholic with non-Catholic facilities.”). 
 38 Carol S. Weisman et al., The Implications of Affiliations Between Catholic and Non-Catholic 
Health Care Organizations for Availability of Reproductive Health Services, 9 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 
121, 126–27 (1999). 
 39 Rachel Benson Gold, Hierarchy Crackdown Clouds Future of Sterilization, EC Provision at 
Catholic Hospitals, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., May 2002, at 11, 11 http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
tgr/05/2/gr050211.pdf [http://perma.cc/6FSB-JF44]. 
 40 Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation — Still More to Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
198, 198 (2014). 
 41 Kenneth R. White, Hospitals Sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church: Separate, Equal, and 
Distinct?, 78 MILBANK Q. 213, 227–28 (2000). 
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Catholic. The non-Catholic hospital likewise may be officially designated as 
Catholic42 or may keep its non-Catholic identity. Irrespective of the 
designation, mergers invariably result in secular entities abiding by Catholic 
doctrine.43 Similarly, joint ventures in which both parties contribute capital 
to create a new separate entity or line of business may require that the joint 
venture adopt a religious identity.44 
In looser affiliations like partnerships, management agreements, or 
leases, each healthcare corporation typically maintains its own identity.45 The 
Catholic partner has no ownership stake in the partnering facility, lessee, or 
joint venturer. Yet these healthcare facilities denominated as secular, 
identified with a non-Catholic religion, or considered public have agreed to 
Catholic religious restrictions on care. 
Joint efforts may result in system-wide religious restrictions. For 
example, in the mid-1990s, secular Elliot Hospital entered into a partnership 
called Optima Health with Catholic Medical Center in Manchester, New 
Hampshire.46 Despite promises to doctors that all treatments could continue 
at Elliot, Optima banned abortions to comply with the directives.47 Similarly, 
in order for two Catholic hospitals to participate in a regional consortium in 
St. Petersburg, Florida, the six nonsectarian hospitals reportedly had to ban 
abortion, in vitro fertilization, and sterilization and permit a nun to review 
their end-of-life policies.48 
 
 42 Weisman et al., supra note 38, at 125 (providing examples). 
 43 See LIZ BUCAR, CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, WHEN CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC 
HOSPITALS MERGE: REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH COMPROMISED 33-50 (1998), 
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1998reprohealthcompromised.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7J58-84WB] (documenting many mergers between 1990 and 1997 resulting in non-
Catholic hospital discontinuing services); Weisman et al., supra note 38, at 132–33 (reporting the end of 
abortion care in case studies, none of which “involved an instance of a non-Catholic organization 
assuming Catholic identity as a result of affiliation” or the merger of Catholic and non-Catholic 
organizations into a Catholic entity); Carol M. Ostrom, Hospitals’ Proposed Affiliation with Catholic 
Systems Opposed, SEATTLE TIMES (published Apr. 27, 2013, 8:00 PM; updated Apr. 27, 2013, 10:01 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/hospitalsrsquo-proposed-affiliation-with-catholic-systems-
opposed [http://perma.cc/6ZKD-ZAA8] (reporting that after acquisition by Catholic Franciscan, Highline 
Medical Center in Washington remained secular but subject to the ERDs). 
 44 Therese Cox, Sisters to Establish Charity Foundation with Profits, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, 
Mar. 5, 1996, at 04D (reporting that a fifty–fifty joint venture between St. Joseph’s Hospital and for-profit 
Columbia/HCA resulted in a ban on abortions and sterilizations within the jointly owned facility). 
 45  UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 16; Weisman et al., supra note 38, at 123. 
 46 Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey: Using the Charitable Trust Doctrine to Preserve 
Women’s Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323, 
344–45 (2000). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Wes Allison & Bryan Gilmer, Bayfront to Leave BayCare, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Oct. 24, 
2000), http://www.sptimes.com/News/102400/TampaBay/Bayfront_to_leave_Bay.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/GU2T-AWTK]. 
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Religious–religious affiliations also generate compliance with Catholic 
rules by non-Catholic partners. For example, Hoag Presbyterian Hospital in 
Newport Beach, California, entered into an agreement with St. Joseph Health 
System to integrate care across their hospitals.49 The transaction purported to 
maintain the partners’ respective faith identities. But, shortly thereafter, 
Hoag announced a halt to nontherapeutic abortions.50 Similarly, when three 
Baptist hospitals in Nashville, Tennessee, affiliated with St. Thomas 
hospitals, the parties committed to “respect and preserve the heritage, 
mission and values of both faith-based organizations.”51 Yet the Baptist 
hospitals agreed to offer only medical services “consistent with Catholic 
canonical law.”52 For the next eleven years, “Baptist Hospital” of Nashville 
operated under the ERDs.53 
Public hospitals also have come under religious restrictions when they 
affiliate, however loosely, with a religious hospital or healthcare system.54 In 
Washington, a number of public health districts have partnered with Catholic 
healthcare systems. In San Juan County, one such district replaced the public 
clinic and hospital with a new facility run under contract with the district by 
Catholic PeaceHealth.55 Although the public district covered one-third of its 
construction costs and uses property taxes to partially subsidize its 
operations, Peace Island Medical Center restricts services according to 
 
 49 Jill Cowan, Hoag Hospital Can Refuse Elective Abortions, State Rules, L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW 
(Apr. 4, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-hoag-abortions-20140404-
story.html [http://perma.cc/YW68-JHDG]. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Nicki Pendleton Wood, Letter Confirms Baptist Planned Sale to St. Thomas and Ascension Health, 
NASHVILLEPOST.COM (May 7, 2001), https://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2001/5/6/
letter_confirms_baptist_planned_sale_to_st_thomas_and_ascension_health [https://perma.cc/2PNC-
SCFX]. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See St. Thomas Health Renaming Baptist, Other Hospitals, WSMV (published July 11, 2013, 5:20 
AM; updated July 25, 2013, 5:20 AM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/22812676/st-thomas-expected-to-
rename [https://perma.cc/XT3Y-7LLQ]. 
 54 UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 16. Management contracts may involve religious-public partners 
as well. See, e.g., Michael Romano, Healthcare Hath No Fury, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 21, 2003, 6, 6 
(noting that Baptist Health Systems of Alabama split ownership of Cullman Regional Medical Center 
fifty-fifty with the Health Care Authority of Cullman County); Shannon Muchmore, Mercy Health 
System Chosen to Manage OSU Medical Center, TULSA WORLD (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/health/mercy-health-system-chosen-to-manage-osu-medical-
center/article_ec04df9d-75bb-5db6-ad83-a1a89376fb9f.html [https://perma.cc/6B6C-TR8J] (reporting 
that a Catholic healthcare system will manage Oklahoma State University Medical Center, “the primary 
hospital for Tulsa’s indigent residents” with 25,000 patient visits annually). 
 55 Aaron Corvin, ACLU Says Faith-Based Hospitals Jeopardize Reproductive, End-of-Life Care, 
COLUMBIAN (Mar. 23, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2013/mar/24/ 
ACLU-faith-based-hospitals-jeopardize-care [https://perma.cc/U3WZ-WSED]. 
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religious doctrine.56 In Austin, Texas, a Catholic hospital entered into a lease 
and management contract with Brackenridge, the public hospital primarily 
responsible for the city’s indigent care.57 The lease agreement made clear that 
Brackenridge would retain ownership and the facility would not be identified 
as Catholic.58 Nevertheless, it requires the public hospital to turn away 
women seeking emergency contraception and refer them to a public clinic 
instead.59 Other proposed public–Catholic hospital affiliations have fallen 
apart due to concerns over healthcare access and Establishment Clause 
limitations.60 
C. Development of Zombie Catholic Hospitals 
Religious identity can survive even after commercial relationships end. 
As hospitals have been sold, religious identity has persisted. Provisions in 
asset purchase agreements and restrictive covenants in deeds continue 
religious identity and/or restrictions after a facility has changed hands from 
a Catholic seller to a secular (and frequently for-profit) buyer. In a 
phenomenon that seems to date to the 1990s, hospitals maintain their 
religious identity under the terms of sales agreements.61 These zombie 
Catholic hospitals claim Catholic identity even as they further no charitable 
mission, grant no role to religious orders, and have no Catholic ownership. 
In other instances, zombie hospitals have no Catholic identity but continue 
to comply with religious rules.62 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Barbra Mann Wall, Conflict and Compromise: Catholic and Public Hospital Partnerships, 
18 NURSING HIST. REV. 100, 100–01 (2010). 
 58 Id. at 101. 
 59 Id. at 110–11. 
 60 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF KY., PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION OF JEWISH HOSPITAL 
HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.: REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL 10, 13 (2011), 
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL] http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
Assets/pdf/CH769761230.PDF [https://perma.cc/42X8-W6H5] (expressing constitutional and policy 
concerns over proposed affiliation between University Medical Center of the public University of 
Louisville and a Catholic system because although the public entities would not be “identified or treated 
as a ‘Catholic’ institution” they agreed to prohibit services in accordance with religious directives); Arthur 
B. LaFrance, Merger of Religious and Public Hospitals: Render unto Caesar, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 
229 (2004) (recounting litigation over the proposed merger of a governmental hospital district—a 
municipal corporation operating a hospital and several clinics—in Oregon and Catholic Providence 
Health System, with the agreement committing the parties to respect the ERDs). 
 61 BUCAR, supra note 43, at 49–50 (documenting ten sales resulting in zombie Catholic hospitals 
from 1990 to 1997). 
 62 See, e.g., Cinda Becker, Pennsylvania Pacts: Catholic Health East Agrees to Sell Pair of 
Hospitals, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20071119/
MAGAZINE/71116003 [https://perma.cc/EW2L-9274] (reporting on the purchase of Mercy Jeannette by 
secular Excela Health, according to which the hospital will be renamed Excela Health Westmoreland 
Hospital but follow Catholic teachings). 
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The primary reason that religious compliance persists is that Catholic 
sellers take the position that at least some commitment to restrictions from 
buyers is nonnegotiable.63 Asset purchase agreements incorporate the ERDs 
as provisions enforceable like any other contract term.64 The agreements 
often require decades or an eternity of compliance.65 
The new owners of formerly religiously affiliated facilities often have 
no religious or moral objection to these health services. Indeed, they may 
provide them at other facilities. They agree to the provisions for a variety of 
reasons. First, they may value the religious name—whose use is contingent 
on maintaining religious restrictions or identity. Second, some for-profit 
chains embrace religious compliance to break into a new market.66 Third, 
some buyers may welcome having a reason to prohibit performance of 
procedures that invite controversy in particular markets. Fourth, as Part II 
will show, buyers may also benefit financially from prior or ongoing 
religious exemptions. 
An intriguing possibility also exists that non-Catholic buyers may 
receive a discount for credible commitment to ERDs. Catholic nonprofits 
previously paid substantially less to purchase a Catholic hospital than would 
for-profit or other nonprofit buyers.67 This selective discounting, researchers 
hypothesized, could be explained by the fact that Catholic buyers “can 
 
 63 See Spencer L. Durland, Note, The Case Against Institutional Conscience, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1655, 1665 (2011) (“Reverend F. Patrick Hanser stated the position as follows: ‘If we would have 
had to compromise any of our ethical or religious values or our Catholic identity, it would have been 
better for us to close.’”); see also infra notes 256, 258. 
 64 CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, MERGER TRENDS 2001: REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE IN 
CATHOLIC SETTINGS 11, 12 (2002), https://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/ 
2001mergertrends.pdf [https://perma.cc/92JX-HJYA] (documenting sales of thirteen Catholic hospitals 
to for-profit healthcare systems with agreements to continued compliance with ERDs); SUSAN BERKE 
FOGEL, MERGERWATCH, FIGHTING RELIGIOUS HEALTH RESTRICTIONS: PREVENTING THE 
CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS WHEN RELIGIOUS HOSPITALS ARE SOLD 3 (2004), 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/816571/11352513/1300824208687/b [https://perma.cc/5MCB-
EP7S] (documenting an additional seven such sales). 
 65 See FOGEL, supra note 64, at 10 (sale of Santa Marta Hospital to for-profit Star Healthcare Group 
required adherence to the ERDs for 30 years); id. at 4 (“According to Richard Fiske of Tenet Healthcare, 
most of the Tenet agreements with Catholic hospitals continue the Directives in perpetuity.”). 
 66 Melanie Evans, Exiting Two States[:] Catholic Health Partners Sheds Hospitals, Debt, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (May 9, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110509/MAGAZINE/
305099964 [https://perma.cc/Q2BF-D8EY] (explaining that in acquiring a Catholic hospital chain, for-
profit Health Management Associates would gain a major market and complete its largest acquisition thus 
far). 
 67 Paul Gertler & Jennifer Kuan, Does It Matter Who Your Buyer Is? The Role of Nonprofit Mission 
in the Market for Corporate Control of Hospitals, 52 J.L. & ECON. 295, 302 (2009) (finding that 
“religious nonprofits discount only to religious buyers” with a discount of about 48% and interpreting 
“this differential discounting to mission, where, for example, a Catholic hospital selling to another 
Catholic hospital can be confident that abortions will not be performed”). 
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credibly commit to not performing abortions and other related actions”; the 
discount thus was “the value to the Catholic seller of a broad set of hard-to-
contract behaviors.”68 Today, however, Catholic sellers tend to contract with 
secular buyers for precisely these behaviors.69 A recent empirical study 
suggests that zombie Catholic hospitals may be commonplace; looking 
across representative states, it found that the rate of performance of tubal 
ligations—a procedure largely barred by the ERDs—did not increase after 
Catholic hospitals were sold to non-Catholic buyers.70 
For-profit buyers have agreed not only to continue Catholic restrictions 
but also to assume the mantle of Catholic identity.71 Since the mid-1990s, 
some for-profit systems—including Tenet Healthcare and Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare—have adopted a strategy of actively marketing themselves as 
willing to preserve religious identity in formerly Catholic facilities.72 Today, 
for example, publicly traded Hospital Corporation of America holds out 
several of its hospitals as part of the ministry of the Roman Catholic 
Church.73 
 
 68 Id. at 296–97; see also Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the 
Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 293 
(2014) (“Counter-parties may rely on religious observance as a low-cost signal of trustworthiness. To be 
sure, the frequency of religious affinity fraud suggests that religion also can be used opportunistically, 
but in many situations it is sufficiently accurate to be a rational response to more expensive systems of 
sorting and monitoring.”). 
 69 Other faith traditions also contract to keep the religious identity of their hospitals alive following 
a sale. For example, Parkview Adventist Medical Center in Maine accepted an offer of acquisition from 
nonsectarian Mid Coast Health Services because it committed to “ensuring the faith-based care continue” 
and to abiding by an “Adventist culture and value system.” Beth Brogan, Brunswick Hospital Leaders 
Laud Merger, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2015/
08/21/business/brunswick-hospital-leaders-laud-merger [https://perma.cc/3EFF-AFLA]. Likewise, some 
formerly Baptist hospitals operate in accordance with Baptist faith and require Baptist representation on 
their boards. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 54. 
 70 Elaine L. Hill et al., Medically Necessary but Forbidden: Reproductive Health Care in Catholic-
Owned Hospitals 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23768, 2017), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23768.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZN-LSMR]. 
 71 Lisa Wangsness, Worcester’s For-Profit St. Vincent May Offer Peek at Boston Hospital’s Future, 
TELEGRAM.COM (published Apr. 28, 2010, 9:36 AM; updated April 28, 2010, 1:26 PM), 
http://www.telegram.com/article/20100428/NEWS/100429713&Template=printart 
[https://perma.cc/993S-BXBU] (discussing for-profit health systems’ purchases of Catholic hospitals and 
maintenance of “religious identity”); see supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text for the requirements 
of officially designated Catholic hospitals. 
 72 Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough: When Religion Controls 
Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 731 (2004) (noting Tenet’s strategy); Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a 
Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1094–95 (1996) (quoting a Columbia executive 
as saying, “As the Catholic hospitals see Columbia as a joint-venture partner, they’ll want to have deals 
where Rick (Scott, Columbia’s president and chief executive officer) and the pope have an equal vote”). 
 73 Gail Bulfin, Mercy Hospital to Be Sold to HCA Chain, ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.miamiarch.org/CatholicDiocese.php?op=Article_10713125945323 [https://perma.cc/6CA2-
9DHZ]. 
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The result has been a peculiar institution: the for-profit, investor-owned 
Catholic hospital.74 For example, after its sale to private equity firm Cerberus 
Capital Management, the six-hospital Caritas Christi Health Care system in 
Boston will maintain not only compliance with the ERDs but also official 
designation as Catholic.75 Describing the agreement, the Wall Street Journal 
remarked, “Catholic nuns, meet your new owners: A three-headed dog from 
hell.”76 Sales of other hospitals to investment firms similarly have preserved 
their official Catholic designation.77 
Agreements for monitoring by local Catholic clergy have been 
concluded as part of these sales.78 For example, parallel to the purchase 
agreement with Caritas, Steward (the healthcare for-profit formed by 
Cerberus) signed a “stewardship agreement” with the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Boston. According to its terms, “the Catholic identity of the 
Caritas system is to be found in its adherence to the Directives and the 
Catholic theological tradition” and in that “all Hospitals will be operated in 
accordance with the moral, ethical and social teachings of the Roman 
 
 74 Melanie Evans, Ascension Looks to Chicago: Alexian Deal Would Be Area’s Latest Consolidation, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 2, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20110502/MAGAZINE/305029960 [https://perma.cc/36U7-KX46] (“Vanguard Health Systems, a for-
profit chain based in Nashville[,] . . . counts the Blackstone Group, a private-equity firm, as a majority 
owner . . . .”). 
 75 Press Release, Office of Att’y Gen. Martha Coakley, Statement of the Massachusetts Attorney 
General as to the Caritas Christi Transaction 16 (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/
nonprofit/caritas/statement-of-the-attorney-general-caritas-christi-transaction.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WXP6-2NPK] [hereinafter Caritas Christi Massachusetts Attorney General Statement]. 
 76 Gregory Corcoran, In Hospital Deal, How Much Is a Catholic Identity Worth? Just 3%, WALL ST. 
J. (June 24, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/06/24/in-hospital-deal-how-much-is-a-
catholic-identity-worth-just-3 [https://perma.cc/BX3P-E4E3]. 
 77 Sister Immacula Wendt, Holy Cross Keeping Catholic Identity, and Other Letters: Keeping Their 
Religion, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110228/
MAGAZINE/110229960 [https://perma.cc/YG95-5NAK] (reporting that Holy Cross of Chicago and St. 
Vincent Hospital of Worcester, Massachusetts will “keep full Roman Catholic identity” after acquisition 
by for-profit and have agreements to “preserve the charitable mission of the hospital and adhere to the 
Catholic ethical and religious directives”). 
 78 See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. Hosps. & Sisters of Charity Health Sys., Sisters of Charity Health 
System and University Hospitals Announce Plans to Transfer Sole Ownership of St. John Medical Center 
in Westlake to UH (Aug. 31, 2015) (on file with author) (reporting the sale of St. John Medical Center in 
Cleveland to University Hospitals with oversight by the bishop and “a mission and values committee to 
ensure that all of the vital components of the hospital’s Catholic identity continue”); Press Release, Univ. 
of Pittsburgh Schs. of the Health Scis., Attorney General Corbett Approves Agreement for Merger of 
Mercy and UPMC (May 25, 2007), http://www.upmc.com/media/NewsReleases/2007/Pages/attorney-
general-corbett-approves-agreement-for-merger-of-mercy-and-upmc.aspx [https://perma.cc/J9SC-
9VZQ] (reporting the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center system’s purchase of 535-bed Mercy 
Hospital, which “will continue to operate as a Catholic hospital, under the canonical oversight of the 
Diocese of Pittsburgh”). 
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Catholic Church as expressed in the Directives and as interpreted solely and 
exclusively by” the archbishop.79 
Under the agreement, an enforcement mechanism in the form of a $25 
million “termination contribution” clause applies if the archbishop 
determines that the for-profit owners have not lived up to their religion-based 
obligations.80 In reviewing and approving the transfer of the hospitals, the 
Attorney General concluded that the amount was “sufficiently high to deter 
Steward from exercising its termination rights as a matter of convenience 
rather than legitimate need.”81 The agreement acknowledges the possibility 
that a hospital may be “obligated pursuant to a Legal Requirement to take 
action” contrary to the ERDs.82 In such case, however, it purports to grant 
the archbishop standing to challenge the legal requirement because of his 
interest in maintaining the Catholic identity of the hospitals.83 
While this agreement does not apply to future owners, it creates 
substantial incentives for Steward to negotiate future compliance with the 
Directives. In particular, it provides that if the hospitals are sold to or merge 
with other institutions, Steward must pay $25 million to the archbishop. It 
may forego payment, however, by securing commitment to the terms of the 
religious stewardship agreement from any future purchaser.84 
Other zombie Catholic hospital sales agreements explicitly bind the 
facility with regard to future owners. For example, in purchasing Queen of 
Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, Tenet 
agreed to abide by the ERDs from 1998 to 2018 and to ensure any subsequent 
owners also followed the Directives until 2018.85 In some instances, property 
law has played a role. In sales of land, restrictive covenants in deeds have 
purported to forever prohibit the use of the property for sterilization, 
 
 79 Stewardship Agreement Between Steward and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston Regarding 
Caritas Christi 3 (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/nonprofit/caritas/executed-stewardship-
agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DJL-E4L2] [hereinafter Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement]. 
 80 Id. at 8, 12, 15. 
 81 Caritas Christi Massachusetts Attorney General Statement, supra note 75, at 27. 
 82 Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement, supra note 79, at 10. 
 83 Id. 
 84 The agreement states: 
In the event of the sale, merger or other transfer of any Hospital (or any substantial portion of its 
assets or operations) by Steward, either RCAB [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston] or Steward 
may terminate this Agreement with respect to such Hospital and its respective services in its sole 
discretion . . . . If neither RCAB or Steward terminates this Agreement with respect to such 
Hospital, Steward, as a condition of closing such sale, merger or other transfer, shall cause the 
transferee to accept the obligations under this Agreement with respect to such Hospital in a form of 
agreement reasonably satisfactory to RCAB and to which RCAB is a named party. 
Id. at 13–14. 
 85 FOGEL, supra note 64, at 4–5. 
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abortion, or assisted suicide.86 When Tenet purchased the Daniel Freeman 
hospitals from a Catholic system, the asset purchase agreement specified that 
the Directives would “run with the land,” applying as long as the property 
included a healthcare facility.87 
A for-profit joint venture between Ascension, the largest Catholic 
healthcare system, and Oak Hill Capital Partners, a private investment firm, 
also envisions constant Catholic compliance, irrespective of ownership.88 
Although a minority owner with a 20% stake, the Catholic partner holds—
by the terms of the agreement—“sole authority in perpetuity over 
compliance with interpretation and application of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives . . . as well as all other elements of Catholic identity—for 
example, charity care and community benefit.”89 The Catholicism of the for-
profit venture purports to last eternally. According to Ascension, “no 
ownership change in the company going forward can change” the Catholic 
partner’s control.90 
One might query whether zombie Catholic hospitals actually abide by 
restrictions or claim Catholic identity once sold from the secular buyer to a 
new owner. Information about subsequent sales is difficult to come by, in 
part because sales of for-profits are less closely scrutinized than are deals 
where a nonprofit hospital converts to for-profit status.91 But several 
examples suggest religious compliance can persist. After buying two St. 
Louis-area hospitals in 2001, Tenet negotiated with the subsequent purchaser 
to preserve compliance with the ERDs.92 In Knoxville, Tennessee, Baptist 
Health System was required to comply with Catholic doctrine and shut down 
 
 86 Associated Press, Hospital Links Its Policy on Abortion to Land Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/06/us/hospital-links-its-policy-on-abortion-to-land-deal.html 
[https://perma.cc/B66E-QZUL] (reporting a deal in which Illinois Masonic Hospital agreed not to 
perform nontherapeutic abortions as a condition of purchasing land from the Catholic Church). 
 87 FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5. While courts are unlikely to uphold a restrictive covenant like this as 
running with the land, it might be enforceable against the buyer and/or for a reasonable period of time 
against future buyers. 
 88 Leo P. Brideau et al., Examples of For-Profit Health Care Models, in IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE 
A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE MINISTRY? 27, 31 (Kathleen M. Boozang ed., 
2012), https://law.shu.edu/Health-Law/upload/Catholic-Health-Care-Symposium-Proceedings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZU8S-YUCK]. 
 89 Id. at 29–31. 
 90 Id. at 31. 
 91 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-24, NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS: 
CONVERSION ISSUES PROMPT INCREASED STATE OVERSIGHT 22 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
230/225067.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXC4-TSBT] (stating that, in most states, the attorney general has 
authority to review nonprofit conversions and, where appropriate, to enforce state requirements that 
protect charitable benefits). 
 92 Judith VandeWater, Tenet Sells 2 St. Louis-Area Community Hospitals, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2004. 
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tubal ligations and fertility treatments after its merger with Catholic St. 
Mary’s Health System.93 The subsequent for-profit, secular buyer—Health 
Management Associates—agreed to continue religious indicia and to 
prohibit abortion and euthanasia across the formerly Baptist and Catholic 
hospitals, now operated under the name Tennova.94 And more than a year 
and a half after Health Management Associates’ sale to Community Health 
Systems, the nation’s largest for-profit system, Tennova’s website continued 
to describe it as a “faith-based healthcare system.”95 Religious compliance 
continued as hospitals changed ownership. 
Zombie religious hospitals, lacking traditional markers of religious 
identity or values, may be created not only through affiliation but also 
through disaffiliation. For example, following a dispute over an abortion at 
St. Joseph’s hospital in Phoenix, the bishop of the Phoenix diocese revoked 
the hospital’s Catholic status.96 The Sisters of Mercy, the women religious 
who founded and sponsored the hospital, however, announced that “they will 
continue their ministry in the hospital.”97 The hospital did not change its 
ownership, name, mission, or “operations, policies, and procedures” and 
committed to “continue through our words and deeds to carry out the healing 
ministry of Jesus.”98 St. Joseph’s parent company, Catholic Healthcare West, 
 
 93 Carly Harrington, Baptist Health System Ceases Tubal Ligations, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL 
(Jan. 25, 2008), http://archive.knoxnews.com/business/baptist-health-system-ceases-tubal-ligations-ep-
412178388-360019551.html [https://perma.cc/68X7-EQQB]. 
 94 Stephanie Bouchard, HMA Aims to Acquire Seven Hospitals, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (May 3, 
2011), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hma-aims-acquire-seven-hospitals [https:// 
perma.cc/AQT4-LUAK] (“Many of the hospitals’ current traditions and values will remain unchanged, 
including its ban on direct abortion and euthanasia services.”). 
 95  East Tennessee’s Tennova Hospitals May Change Hands Again, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL 
(Aug. 05, 2013), http://archive.knoxnews.com/business/east-tennessees-tennova-hospitals-may-change-
hands-again-ep-510602780-355599891.html [https://perma.cc/TRV6-DN62]; see also Shelley DuBois, 
Community Health Systems Completes Purchase of HMA, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 26, 2014, 11:00 PM), 
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2014/01/27/community-health-systems-completes-purchase-of-
hma/4935729 [https://perma.cc/P7UN-GF5B]; About Tennova Healthcare, TENNOVA HEALTHCARE 
(2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150710012339/http://www.tennova.com 
[https://perma.cc/4CWZ-SAW7]. 
 96 Dan Harris, Bishop Strips Hospital of Catholic Status After Abortion, ABC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/abortion-debate-hospital-stripped-catholic-status/story? 
id=12455295. See generally Gerald D. Coleman S. S., Direct and Indirect Abortion in the Roman 
Catholic Tradition: A Review of the Phoenix Case, 25 HEC F. 127 (2013) (discussing the conflict). 
 97 Press Release, St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Bishop Olmsted Announcement: Frequently Asked 
Questions 2 (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.dignityhealth.org/cm/Media/documents/Bishop-Olmsted-
Announcement-Frequently-Asked-Questions-1-7-11stellent/groups/public/@xinternet_con_sys/
documents/webcontent/212448.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG7Y-B4E5]. 
 98 Press Release, St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., St. Joseph’s Resolved in Saving Mother’s Life, 
Confident Following Bishop’s Announcement 1 (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.dignityhealth.org/cm/
Media/documents/St-Josephs-Resolved-in-Saving-Mothers-Life-12-21-10stellent/groups/public/
@xinternet_con_sys/documents.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC2W-TE92]. 
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subsequently restructured its governance to become Dignity Health, a 
nonprofit “rooted in the Catholic tradition, but . . . not an official ministry of 
the Catholic Church.”99 
In sum, institutions operating under Catholic doctrine fall along a 
spectrum. The first-order institutions—those officially designated Catholic 
hospitals—have a sponsoring religious order, are nonprofit, and are 
recognizable as religious (due to their names or symbols). They lack, 
however, the many attributes that they once had, such as a community of 
Catholic administrators, owners, and workers, funding through charitable 
donations, service to the poor, and close ties to religious orders. Further 
along the spectrum, the second-order affiliates involve no Catholic 
ownership interest and are outwardly non-Catholic yet assume Catholic 
restrictions through contract. At the far end of the spectrum are the third-
order zombie religious institutions—hospitals that have no ongoing 
relationship to a church or union of religious people but nevertheless express 
Catholic identity. Almost uniformly, they do so to meet their contractual 
obligations. But increasingly they may seek the opportunity to self-designate 
as religious even in the absence of contract. 
 
*          *          * 
 
The contracting of religion creates two distinct problems, which the 
next two Parts explore. First, contracting religious identity may entitle or 
require second- and third-order institutions to claim exemptions from 
otherwise applicable laws. The interplay between vague exemption language 
and clear contractual obligation may impede public policy goals as the pool 
of exempted institutions grows. Second, the ever-expanding category of 
“religious institution” destabilizes theories of religious institutionalism that 
rest on the specialness of religious institutions and argue for their near-total 
autonomy from state regulation. 
II. UNDERMINING PUBLIC POLICY 
Religious contract provisions not only operate as private agreements 
but also affect public law. Unlike other contract terms, they potentially allow 
institutions to claim religious exemption from otherwise applicable laws. 
Section II.A explores the interplay between contract provisions on the one 
hand and statutory and judicial exemptions on the other. It shows that 
 
 99 Press Release, Catholic Healthcare W., Catholic Healthcare West Is Now Dignity Health 1 (Jan. 
23, 2012), http://www.dignityhealth.org/-/media/cm/media/documents/Press%20Releases/2012-01-23-
Catholic-Healthcare-West-is-Now-Dignity-Health.ashx [https://perma.cc/7APG-EWQH]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
948 
partners, affiliates, and formerly religious hospitals may acquire legal status 
as religious for the purpose of exemption from employment 
antidiscrimination laws, medical conscience legislation, and employee 
benefit protections, among others. They similarly may be able to demand 
judicial accommodation under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA)100 and perhaps the Constitution. Section II.B explains how 
regulatory arbitrage becomes increasingly plausible as religious exemptions 
gain financial value and competitors become exempt. Section II.C contends 
that as the number of exempt institutions grows, exemption may become the 
rule, and the assumptions under which institutional exemptions were granted 
may no longer hold. 
A. Interplay Between Contract and Exemption 
While religious accommodation of individuals is grounded in 
individual conscience or faith, exemptions of institutions tend to be justified 
as preserving shared faith or church mission.101 But, in commerce, contracts 
instead potentially create eligibility for religious exemption. They also may 
authorize a diverse array of entities to seek religious exemption under state 
and federal religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs) and the 
Constitution.102 This relationship between contract and exemption matters 
because contracts for religious adherence often promote not corporate social 
responsibility—which presumes surpassing regulatory minimums—but 
below normal levels of regulatory compliance. 
1. Exemptions for Religious Institutions 
Religious institutions most commonly enjoy exemptions in their roles 
as employers. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and state 
antidiscrimination laws authorize religious organizations to discriminate in 
favor of employees who share their religion.103 Religious entities may also 
 
 100 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012). 
 101 See, e.g., Steven H. Miles et al., Conflicts Between Patients’ Wishes to Forgo Treatment and the 
Policies of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 48, 50 (1989) (arguing that as society 
recognizes patients’ rights to forego life-sustaining treatment, it must also preserve the “distinct moral 
communities” embodied by healthcare facilities and reflected in their mission statements). 
 102 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). As of May 2017, twenty-one states had enacted state RFRAs with 
similar language to the federal RFRA. See Jonathan Griffin, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/AF96-VLMM]. 
 103 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (stating that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply “to 
a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities”); IDAHO CODE § 67-5910(2)(c) (2016) 
(providing that it is not a discriminatory practice for a religious educational institution or an educational 
organization to limit employment or give preference to members of the same religion); see also Kennedy 
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avoid employee benefits regulation. The Employee Retirement Investment 
Security Act (ERISA), for example, exempts “church plans” providing 
pension, retirement, and welfare benefits from minimum funding, notice, and 
other statutory requirements meant to protect employees’ interests.104 
Occasionally, religious entities receive special treatment with regard to 
duties toward the public or consumers. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), for example, prohibits public accommodations from discriminating 
against people with disabilities but contains a religious exemption.105 State 
conscience legislation also may permit healthcare institutions to refuse to 
perform certain procedures, most frequently abortion, end-of-life care, and 
sterilization.106 While healthcare providers have no legal obligation to offer 
any particular service, such laws may exempt them from legal duties to treat 
a patient in accordance with acceptable standards of medical practice, to 
inform her of treatments and their risks and benefits, to refer her for services 
they are not able to provide, and not to abandon her.107 They may also lift 
statutory duties to stabilize or treat patients suffering from emergency 
conditions,108 to ensure rape survivors access to emergency contraception,109 
to offer counseling to terminally ill patients about palliative care,110 and to 
honor advance directives.111 
 
v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 2011) (dismissing under Title VII exemption 
claims of religious harassment, retaliation, and wrongful discharge brought by a member of the Church 
of the Brethren who was a geriatric nursing assistant in Catholic nursing facility); Saeemodarae v. Mercy 
Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (barring a practicing Wiccan’s Title VII 
claims of religious discrimination against Catholic hospital); Farnam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830, 
840 (Wash. 1991) (holding, under state employment discrimination law, that the mission and holding out 
of an exempt religious umbrella organization extended the exemption to its subdivisions, in that case a 
nursing home). 
 104 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2012). 
 105 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2012). 
 106 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 18-611(2) (2016); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41-107-7 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2015). 
 107 61 AM. JUR. 2D PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, & OTHER HEALERS § 121 (2017); see also Maxine M. 
Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle 
Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 804, 822–23 (2007). 
 108 See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (2016). State laws, however, cannot exempt hospitals 
from the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
 109 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.11(e) (Deering 2016); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.2 (2016); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-10D-3 (2016); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-p (McKinney 2016); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2907.29 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1350(B) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 70.41.350(1)(c) (2016); see also State Policies on Contraception, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/united-states/contraception/state-policies-contraception [https://perma.cc/ 
C6JV-DCFF]. 
 110 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2016). 
 111 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(3) (LexisNexis 2016). 
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Religious institutions also may request judicial accommodation from 
legal mandates under the Constitution and through operation of statute. The 
First Amendment of the Constitution allows religious institutions to demand 
a ministerial exception from laws regulating their relationships with 
employees deemed “ministers.”112 More broadly, federal and state RFRAs 
protect against governmental imposition of a substantial burden on religion 
unless it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”113 
2. Determining Entitlement to Religious Exemptions 
While some statutes circumscribe the institutions entitled to exemption, 
most contain no definition of religious institution or organization.114 The 
ADA exempts “religious organizations or entities controlled by religious 
organizations.”115 The statute, however, does not define the terms, and the 
ADA’s implementing regulations take the perspective that the exemption “is 
very broad, encompassing a wide variety of situations.”116 Title VII, for 
example, says “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society,” without more.117 Courts agree on the fact that this language extends 
beyond houses of worship but on little else.118 
 
 112 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012). 
Some courts apply the ministerial exception more broadly to encompass claims based on contract. See, 
e.g., DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 889 (Wis. 2012). 
 113 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). The federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA) further permits “a religious assembly or institution” an exemption from a land use 
regulation that imposes a substantial burden on its religious exercise unless the regulation is in the 
“furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means of furthering” that 
interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 114 For scholarly examination of statutory definitions of religious institutions, see generally Bruce N. 
Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious 
Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979), proposing evaluating a religious organization’s activities 
along a spectrum from a spiritual core to the secular, and Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?: 
Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401 (2013), arguing 
that religious institutions should be exempted from legal mandates under the theory of implied consent. 
 115 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2012). 
 116 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, § 36.104 (2017); see also Rose v. Cahee, 727 F. Supp. 2d 728, 748 (E.D. 
Wis. 2010) (interpreting the ADA’s religious organization exemption to protect an officially designated 
Catholic healthcare system). 
 117 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). 
 118 For a sense of the variety of tests in use, see LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 
503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007), balancing nine different factors; Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care 
Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000), also balancing nine different factors; Killinger v. Samford 
Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1997), “sufficiently ‘sectarian’”; EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop 
Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993), “primarily religious”; and Fike v. United Methodist Children’s 
Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286, 289–90 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983). 
112:929 (2018) Zombie Religious Institutions 
951 
The ambiguous and broad language of institutional exemptions often 
leads courts to use a number of contradictory factors to identify a religious 
institution. Across contexts, an official link to an established church proves 
relevant.119 Courts may look to control by a religious institution through 
board representation or involvement in management.120 Less often, courts 
take an associational view of the institution, requiring a religious entity to 
serve and employ coreligionists. Alternatively, mission-oriented 
characteristics can indicate religious status. Courts examine the corporate 
structure, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or other corporate documents for 
religious references.121 They may look to whether an entity held itself out as 
religious such that “the religious character of the institution was open and 
obvious” to employees or the public.122 Finally, the profit- or revenue-
seeking nature of an enterprise can indicate secular pursuits. Statutes may 
expressly limit the scope of institutional accommodation to nonprofit 
entities.123 And, sometimes, where statutes are silent, courts have identified 
nonprofit status as a marker (or, indeed, the marker) of religiosity.124 While 
statutes vary, courts typically apply some mix of these factors, emphasizing 
and deemphasizing particular ones. 
 
 119 Some statutory language so requires. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (2012) (defining an 
organization eligible to participate in church plans exempted from ERISA as one “associated with a 
church or a convention or association of churches” where the organization “shares common religious 
bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of churches”). 
 120 LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226 (suggesting as a factor for determining religious exemption under Title 
VII “whether a formally religious entity participates in the management, for instance by having 
representatives on the board of trustees”). 
 121 See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a nursing home is a “religious institution” for purposes of ministerial exception so as to 
exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act whenever its “mission is marked by clear or obvious religious 
characteristics”); see also Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 734 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, 
J., concurring) (setting out a test consisting of (1) nonprofit status, (2) a self-identified religious purpose, 
(3) activity consistent with and in furtherance of those purposes, and (4) holding oneself out as religious); 
Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (barring a Wiccan 
employee’s religious discrimination claim against Catholic hospital). 
 122 Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1891, 1936 (2013). Helfand notes that “the court in Shaliehsabou also emphasized various ways in 
which the defendant conducted business such that it would be obvious to an employee that the institution 
was religious.” Id. 
 123 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.26 (2013) (exempting “religious association, religious corporation, 
or religious society that is not organized for private profit” from “taking any action with respect to the 
provision of goods, services, facilities, or accommodations directly related to the solemnization or 
celebration of a civil marriage that is in violation of its religious beliefs”). 
 124 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The fact that an operation is not 
organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular 
in orientation.”); see also World Vision, 633 F.3d at 734 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“[A]n 
organization’s status as a nonprofit bolsters a claim that its purpose is nonpecuniary.”). 
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With regard to RFRA and the First Amendment ministerial exception, 
judicial tests—though ill-defined—also seem to employ multiple factors to 
discern religious belief in institutional form. For example, in interpreting 
“person” capable of exercising religion under RFRA to include for-profit 
corporations, the Supreme Court, in its Hobby Lobby decision, dismissed the 
idea that religious affiliation or incorporation as religious is a prerequisite 
for religiosity.125 Instead, it highlighted the associational interests preserved 
through institutional religious identity. As the Court saw it, a for-profit 
corporation unites individuals in their devotion to religious tenets, just as a 
religious organization might.126 The Court, however, also seemed to accept a 
view of religious identity focused on the entity and thus noted that corporate 
documents could manifest religion.127 
In elaborating on the constitutional ministerial exception in Hosanna-
Tabor, the Court was similarly imprecise. It used the terms “church,” 
“religious organization,” “religious group,” and “religious institution” 
interchangeably in a case involving a school.128 Indeed, courts have 
interpreted the ministerial exception to allow healthcare entities to engage in 
discrimination against and undercompensate employees.129 For example, one 
court dismissed a racial and religious discrimination claim brought by a 
hospital chaplain against New York Methodist Hospital, part of the New 
York-Presbyterian Healthcare system.130 The hospital had not been owned by 
the Methodist Church for decades, had revised its certificate of incorporation 
to remove any relation to the church, affirmatively had stated that it was a 
secular organization, and had employed members of various faiths within its 
pastoral program. Nonetheless, the court held that the hospital was entitled 
to the ministerial exception through its historic relationship to the church, 
active pastoral care (admittedly provided by leaders of various faiths, as it is 
 
 125 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014). 
 126 Id. at 2768–69 (noting that the protection of corporate religion safeguards the rights of “the people 
(including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or 
another”). 
 127 Id. at 2764–66 (noting that Conestoga Wood’s “Vision and Values Statements” required the 
company to “ensur[e] a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects [the shareholders’] Christian heritage” 
and Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose committed to “operating the company in a manner consistent 
with Biblical principles” (first and second alteration in original)). 
 128 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 173, 181, 
188 (2012). 
 129 See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (precluding ADA 
claims of resident in clinical pastoral education program in hospital); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of 
Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309–11 (4th Cir. 2004) (preventing kosher supervisor from proceeding 
with Fair Labor Standards Act wage claim against Jewish nursing home); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal 
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (barring hospital chaplain’s sex and age discrimination 
claims). 
 130 Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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in secular hospitals), maintenance of “Methodist” in its name, and significant 
required Methodist representation on its board.131 The hospital was “acting 
as a religious institution” with regard to the plaintiff—even though it was 
“primarily a secular institution.”132 
The various affiliates of churches and the rise of parachurch 
organizations unconnected to an official church have occasionally 
challenged courts and regulators,133 but the increasing combination of 
religion and commerce (or even the pursuit of profit) poses more difficult 
questions about which institutions count as religious. In particular, what does 
it mean for an institution to be religious in a market where commercial 
agreements call for religious adherence? A number of courts (and scholars) 
include officially designated Catholic hospitals within the realm of religious 
institutions for purposes of statutory and constitutional exemptions.134 But 
are these “original” first-order religious institutions entitled to 
accommodation also authorized to extend exemption to their commercial 
counterparts through contract? 
Contracted-for religious identity and compliance add complexity that 
statutory language and constitutional doctrine are currently ill prepared to 
confront. As this Article demonstrated in Part I, facilities may claim 
“Catholic” identity even when they further no charitable mission, when they 
are repudiated by the Church, or when Catholic entities hold no ownership 
stake. The inclusion of public entities and for-profit investment funds in the 
universe of enterprises following religious restrictions further confounds. 
While one can easily tell where a natural person begins and ends, the 
demarcation of the boundaries of an institution presents a thornier problem. 
Even in a single statutory framework, factors used to identify a religious 
institution point in different directions with regard to contracted-for religion. 
Recall the Caritas system in Boston that was sold to for-profit Cerberus.135 
 
 131 Id. at 182. 
 132 Id. at 183. 
 133 Thomas M. Messner, Can Parachurch Organizations Hire and Fire on the Basis of Religion 
Without Violating Title VII?, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 69–71 (2006) (explaining that the broader 
question of which parachurch organizations are “religious” remains latent). 
 134 Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“Courts view the Official 
Catholic Directory listing as a public declaration by the Roman Catholic Church that an organization is 
associated with the Church.”); see also Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 
2d 77, 85–86 (D. Me. 2004) (referring to, inter alia, the Official Catholic Directory as evidence that 
Catholic Charities’ health benefit plans qualify for ERISA church plan status); Hartwig v. Albertus 
Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202–03 (D. Conn. 2000) (“[T]he Official Catholic Directory . . . is the 
definitive compilation of Roman Catholic institutions in the United States.”). For examples in the 
scholarly literature, see supra note 13. 
 135 See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text (describing the sale of Caritas Assets to 
Cerberus—a private equity fund—and the provisions of the Asset Sale and Purchase Agreement). 
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The facilities now are for-profit and investor owned, and the Church has no 
direct or indirect financial interest in the facilities. If, however, courts 
deferred to the Catholic hierarchy, the chain would be considered Catholic 
and thus a religious institution. Examination of corporate documents might 
lead to a similar result, as Cerberus agreed to continue the chain’s Catholic 
identity, Catholic officials exercise oversight of the facilities, and the ERDs 
constitute corporate policy.136 Alternatively, courts might find disqualifying 
the absence of Church hierarchy from the board of directors and its ultimate 
lack of control over corporate assets.137 Courts considering the outward signs 
of the religious character of the institution might be swayed by Cerberus’s 
contractual agreement to maintain pastoral care, chaplaincy, and religious 
symbols.138 If, as some argue, “an organization that affiliates with a religious 
group, declares a religious mission, and has some religious qualities will 
qualify for the exemption” under Title VII,139 many formerly religious and 
nominally secular hospitals will be allowed to engage in religious 
discrimination. 
Courts might reach contradictory results depending on their form of 
inquiry. If ownership is determinative, Baptist ownership of 50% of Cullman 
Regional Medical Center (in a public-private partnership) might make that 
facility more religious than the for-profit hospital formed in an 80–20 joint 
venture between for-profit secular Oak Hill Capital and Catholic Ascension 
Health.140 If the obviousness of religious identity matters, now-secular West 
Suburban hospital might be disqualified from claiming it is a religious 
institution because of its lack of religious symbols or message despite having 
assumed obligations to abide by Catholic directives.141 By contrast, 
otherwise-identical Tennova health system—a once-Baptist/Catholic 
system—could continue to claim its stated identity as a “faith-based 
organization” and likely any exemptions for which it was previously 
eligible.142 
 
 136 See generally Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement, supra note 79 (contracting for the 
continuation of Catholic healthcare standards after the sale to a for-profit entity). 
 137 Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding 
that a religious hospital qualified as a religious institution for the purposes of the ministerial exception in 
part because of the composition of the board of directors and that the articles of association could only be 
amended by approval of church hierarchy). 
 138 Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement, supra note 79, at 4–5. 
 139 Roger W. Dyer, Jr., Note, Qualifying for the Title VII Religious Organization Exemption: Federal 
Circuits Split over Proper Test, 76 MO. L. REV. 545, 556–57 (2011). 
 140 See Romano, supra note 54; supra note 88. 
 141 See Stempniak, supra note 1 (noting that religious artifacts will be removed but the hospitals will 
follow Catholic healthcare directives). 
 142 See supra note 95. 
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Mixed-religion institutions further complicate analysis. For example, 
Baptist hospitals have affiliated with Catholic facilities, agreeing to comply 
with Catholic doctrine but receiving assurances that the Baptist faith and 
identity will continue.143 In the case of a nontherapeutic abortion where the 
Catholic and Baptist teachings align, the Baptist hospital could assert its 
Baptist faith. It seems plausible, however, that if it later denies a tubal 
ligation to comply with the Catholic directives, it would raise Catholic faith 
as qualifying it for exemption in states that allow for religious refusals. 
B. Potential for Regulatory Arbitrage 
In healthcare, contract and exemption tend to operate together, with 
institutions acquiring religious identity through connection to “original” 
first-order religious institutions. Hospital owners generally have not 
strategically denominated facilities as religious. Nonetheless, some 
healthcare systems now unite Catholic, non-Catholic, and secular facilities, 
and take religious exemptions when expedient. And Dignity Health, 
discussed in Part I, disaffiliated with the Church but continues to claim 
Catholic identity.144 
Where corporate identity is easy to acquire and religious exemptions 
are financially valuable, regulatory arbitrage may become a more common 
practice. Commercial actors whose competitors enjoy religious exemption 
through contract may come to self-designate as religious. In that case, the 
concern shifts from the scope of contractual obligation squarely to the 
breadth of exemption. 
Some judicial tests for the identification of religious institutions leave 
the door open for corporations to self-designate as religious and therefore 
entitled to exemption. For example, in Spencer v. World Vision, Judge 
Diarmuid O’Scannlain indicated that, provided a corporation was nonprofit, 
its identification of a religious identity and purpose sufficed to bring it within 
the scope of Title VII’s institutional exemption.145 Thus, the entity’s ability 
to claim religious exemption lay primarily within its control. Concurring in 
the result, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld disagreed on this point, signaling alarm 
about potential gaming of the religious exemption. Focusing on corporate 
documents allowed, he said, “nonprofit institutions with church affiliations 
to use their affiliations as a cover for religious discrimination in secular 
 
 143 See Wood, supra note 51 (describing affiliation of Baptist and Catholic hospitals that committed 
to preserving the religious values of both faiths).  
 144 See Press Release, Catholic Healthcare W., supra note 99 (stating that the new name of the 
hospital reflects the reality that the hospital, though rooted in Catholic principles, is not officially 
connected to the Catholic Church). 
 145 619 F.3d 1109, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting out this proposed test). 
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employment” and “people to advance discriminatory objectives outside the 
context of religious exercise by means of mere corporate paperwork.”146 
Following the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision, for-profit 
corporations may be able to self-designate as religious for purposes of RFRA 
as well. The decision seemingly allows a corporation to establish religious 
identity through corporate documents,147 even those prepared in anticipation 
of litigation.148 Any such company then can become eligible to claim 
exemption from federal law under RFRA. 
Where economic interest aligns with religious exemption, commercial 
operations may claim religious status opportunistically. As Judge Mary Beck 
Briscoe noted in her dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby opinion, 
[I]f all it takes for a corporation to be categorized as a “faith based business” 
for purposes of RFRA is a combination of a general religious statement in the 
corporation’s statement of purpose and more specific religious beliefs on the 
part of the corporation’s founders or owners, the majority’s holding will have, 
intentionally or unwittingly, opened the floodgates to RFRA litigation 
challenging any number of federal statutes that govern corporate affairs.149 
Whereas the grant of an exemption for the religious use of peyote, for 
example, is “self-limiting” by virtue of the drug’s unpleasantness,150 
exemption from employer regulation has no such limits. Given the breadth 
of Title VII’s language regarding religious organizations, another court 
worried that it too could come to “immunize[] virtually every endeavor 
undertaken by a religious organization,” even including “a trucking firm, a 
chain of motels, a race track, a telephone company, a railroad, a fried chicken 
franchise, or a professional football team.”151 A wide pool of claimants might 
 
 146 Id. at 1130 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); id. at 1127; see also id. at 1147 (Berzon, J., dissenting) 
(expressing concern that rejecting the inquiry into the link between commercial activity and self-identified 
religious purpose means “disregard[ing] the fact that the manufacture of equipment remains the 
organization’s primary operational pursuit and that there is nothing more than the asserted religious 
beliefs of the organization’s founders to connect that secular activity to the stated religious purpose”). 
 147 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014) (looking to corporate 
documents of for-profit Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood). 
 148 See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403 (E.D. Pa. 
2013) (noting that more than a year after the contraceptive regulation was issued but before its plan 
became subject to the mandate, “the board of directors adopted ‘The Hahn Family Statement on the 
Sanctity of Human Life’”). 
 149 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1174 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014). 
 150 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 914 n.7 (1990) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“The peyote plant is extremely bitter, and eating it is an unpleasant experience, which would 
tend to discourage casual or recreational use.”). 
 151 King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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emerge in the event that, as some claim, a significant and increasing trend 
exists toward bringing religion into corporate governance.152 
The expanding use of ERISA’s church plan exemption makes manifest 
the potential appeal to commercial actors of religious identity and 
exemption.153 Church plan status provides great financial value because it 
permits employers to underfund pension plans, avoid federal pension 
insurance payments, and fail to notify employees of the plan’s status.154 The 
exemption in turn can aid the sale of religiously affiliated hospitals to secular 
buyers (which then assume no pension obligations) and the purchase of 
hospitals by religious systems, which can deregulate the pension plans after 
purchase (even if the hospitals remain secular).155 
Indeed, healthcare systems and hospitals use church plans selectively. 
They label pensions “church plans” to avoid ERISA’s extensive regulation 
but categorize health benefits as ERISA plans to benefit from ERISA 
preemption of state insurance regulations.156 Other healthcare entities have 
converted their employees’ long-standing ERISA pension plans to church 
plan status in response to the economic downturn157 or on the advice of 
consulting firms.158 Four of the nation’s ten largest multimillion-dollar 
 
 152 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 180–81 (2014) 
(arguing that people increasingly integrate business and religion); Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary Is 
the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1414–15 (2012) (arguing that “reality of the corporate 
landscape” shows a commitment to religious and moral positions). 
 153 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (2012) (defining “church plan”). ERISA exempts church plans 
providing pension, retirement, and welfare benefits from minimum funding, notice, and other statutory 
requirements that would otherwise protect employees. Id. 
 154 Norman Stein, AM. BAR. ASS’N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, An Article of Faith: The 
Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church Plans, EMP. BENEFITS COMM. NEWSLETTER (2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/fai
th.html [https://perma.cc/5NLH-THEJ] (noting the consequences of receiving church plan status from the 
IRS). 
 155 Karin Price Mueller, Bamboozled: How Catholic Hospitals Get Away with Letting Pensions Go 
Broke, NJ.COM (published Nov. 28, 2016, 9:09 AM; updated Nov. 28, 2016, 9:40 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2016/11/bamboozled_how_catholic_hospitals_get_away_with_le
.html [https://perma.cc/3279-CDKX] (discussing conversions of Catholic hospital employee pension 
plans to underfunded church plans and subsequent sales of hospitals to nonprofit and for-profit buyers 
that thus assumed no funding obligations). 
 156 See, e.g., Complaint – Class Action at 41–45, Griffith v. Providence Health & Servs., No. 2:14-
cv-01720 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2014), ECF No. 1 (noting that Providence, a large healthcare system with 
73,000 employees, claims its pension plan is an exempt church plan but follows ERISA for its welfare 
benefit plan). 
 157 See, e.g., Kaplan v. St. Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at 
*2 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014) (noting that SPHS filed its application for church plan status during the 
nationwide economic downturn in 2006). 
 158 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, I.R.S. Reversal on ‘Church’ Pension Plan Rescues a Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/an-irs-reversal-rescues-a-pension-
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healthcare systems in 2017 operated their pension plans as church plans.159 
In this way, they avoided regulations to which their secular competitors are 
subject. 
C. Exception Swallowing the Rule 
In crafting religious accommodations, legislatures and courts take as a 
fundamental premise that accommodation does not defeat the purpose of the 
law. As Professor Perry Dane describes them, free exercise exemptions are 
“more an island in a world of legal obligation than an overarching challenge 
to the notion of such obligation.”160 Religious objectors will not become so 
numerous or so powerful as to thwart the achievement of policy goals or 
threaten the rights of other citizens. This prediction of relatively small 
numbers of objectors relies—in part—on the impermanence of objectors. 
Individuals die, commercial actors fail in the marketplace, and their 
exemptions go with them. This Section examines litigation surrounding the 
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate, ERISA church plan 
exemption eligibility, and conscience legislation to demonstrate how 
contract expands religious exemptions and risks the rule. 
Recent litigation against the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive 
mandate highlights the role of private law in widening religiosity and 
exemption. Hobby Lobby involved a corporation that used private law both 
to create and to perpetuate religious identity. Family members involved in 
the ownership and direction of the corporation had to agree to religious 
 
fund.html [https://perma.cc/6FXG-ZHAR] (“Tough economic times, and pitches from benefits 
consultants, have prompted more than 100 faith-based employers to seek church plan status . . . .”). 
 159 Laura Dyrda, 10 Largest US Health Systems: Which Had the Biggest Revenue Increase in 2016?, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-finance/10-
largest-us-health-systems-which-had-the-biggest-revenue-increase-in-2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/H5B7-6KXV] (showing increase in patient revenues in ten largest health systems); see 
also Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); Overall 
v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (same); Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp. 
3d 909, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same); Complaint – Class Action, supra note 156, at 1–2 (noting that the 
healthcare employer’s retirement plan was claimed to be a “church plan” under ERISA); Complaint – 
Class Action at 1–2, Chavies v. Catholic Health E., No. 2:13-cv-01645-CDJ (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013), 
ECF No. 1 (same). 
 160 Perry Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 119 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010), Blackwell Reference Online. 
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precepts.161 A trust ensured that, even after the company’s founder and family 
patriarch steps down, the corporation will continue on as religious.162 
In other litigation against the mandate, contract again was at issue. 
Nonprofit religious employers argued that their accommodation from the 
contraceptive mandate did not suffice because their religious convictions 
forbid them from contracting with companies that must comply with their 
own regulatory obligations to provide contraception to the nonprofits’ 
employees.163 In effect, the employers demanded accommodation for entities 
with which they have a contractual relationship. 
Contracted-for religious compliance may convert the religious 
principles of a minority into the practice of a plurality, or majority, of people. 
ERISA’s church plan exemption offers an example where affiliations have 
widened the reach of religious exemption. At the core of the church plan 
exemption is the institutional church. The statute thus requires an 
“association” with a church, focusing on whether an entity shares “common 
religious bonds and convictions with that church.”164 Through affiliation, 
nonchurch entities—like hospitals and social service providers—have 
benefited from deregulation of their employees’ pension plans.165 
Religious health systems have brought secular entities under their 
umbrella and into the exemption regime. For example, Providence—a 
Catholic healthcare system with thirty-four hospitals and more than 73,000 
employees—claimed a church plan exemption for its pension plan. Included 
in that plan were employees of recently acquired facilities with no religious 
 
 161 Verified Complaint at 9, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 
2012) (No. 5:12-CV-01000-HE), 2012 WL 4009450 (noting that all family members “must sign a Trust 
Commitment, which among other things requires them to affirm the Green family statement of faith and 
to ‘regularly seek to maintain a close intimate walk with the Lord Jesus Christ by regularly investing time 
in His Word and prayer’”). 
 162 David Whitford, Hobby Lobby’s Religious Real Estate Hobby, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 2010, 6:10 
AM), http://archive.fortune.com/2010/10/21/news/companies/hobby_lobby_philanthropy.fortune/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/R2QH-5URC] (“[W]hen Green [the company’s founder] dies, ownership of 
Hobby Lobby will pass to a trust, eliminating any possible means or motive on the part of his descendants 
to sell, go public, or otherwise interrupt the [religious identity].”). 
 163 See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014) (summarizing Notre 
Dame’s argument that the contraceptive mandate “imposes a substantial burden on it by forcing the 
university to ‘identify[ ] and contract[ ] with a third party willing to provide the very services Notre Dame 
deems objectionable’” (alterations in original)). 
 164 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (2012) (defining an organization eligible to participate in church 
plans exempted from ERISA as one “associated with a church or a convention or association of churches” 
where the organization “shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention 
or association of churches”). 
 165 Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d, 816, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (noting plaintiff’s arguments 
that Ascension lacked common bonds with a church and acted like a secular, revenue-seeking entity, in 
particular through its many joint ventures with for-profits). 
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identity.166 Having cut ties with the Catholic Church, another health system, 
Dignity Health, nonetheless has argued that its employee retirement plan is 
a “church plan” not subject to regulation under ERISA.167 For approximately 
two decades, the IRS routinely issued letter rulings in favor of church plan 
status for such entities.168 
The interaction between contract and conscience legislation offers 
another example of the exception risking the rule. Conscience laws offer 
broad immunity from regulatory enforcement, professional discipline, and 
tort liability to clinicians who refuse to provide certain services, such as 
abortion care, for religious reasons.169 Contracts requiring refusal of certain 
procedures potentially shape the scope of this exemption in two ways. First, 
contracts of religious compliance inevitably affect individual religious 
exemption. As a rule, conscience legislation requires that individual 
providers hold religious, moral, or ethical reasons for refusing care. If a 
provider holds no such beliefs but refuses care in compliance with contract, 
would he fall within the reach of the exemption? Contractual terms that 
require him to withhold care or information from patients seem to constitute 
an agreement to commit a tort (unenforceable as a matter of public policy) 
but have been used to create compliance in religious institutions for decades. 
Second, secular partners of religious entities may acquire immunity 
through commercial transaction. In some states, any entity may refuse to 
provide abortions for any reason; the institution need not claim a religious 
reason for refusal.170 In those states, contracts requiring refusal of services 
for religious reasons shift practice in the healthcare marketplace but do not 
 
 166 Complaint – Class Action, supra note 156, at 20, 28. 
 167 Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp. 3d 909, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 168 See Stein, supra note 154; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007 (July 1, 1983), 1983 WL 
197946 (construing ERISA’s requirement that a church plan be established and maintained by a church 
to allow a plan to qualify as a “church plan” where it is maintained by an entity “associated” with a 
church). 
 169 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C) (2017) (“A health care provider is not subject to 
criminal or civil liability or professional discipline for . . . [f]ailing to comply with a decision or a 
direction [at the end of life] that violates the provider’s conscience . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-3 
(West 2016) (“The refusal to perform, assist in the performance of, or provide abortion services or 
sterilization procedures shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal liability, disciplinary action or 
discriminatory treatment.”). 
 170 Typical statutory language reads: “A hospital is not required to admit any patient for the purpose 
of performing an abortion.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(A) (2017). Several also allow refusals of 
other procedures without religious or moral reason. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-447 (2012) (“No 
medical care facility, medical care facility administrator, or governing board of any medical care facility 
shall be required to permit the performance, referral for or participation in medical procedures resulting 
in sterilization within its facility . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-410(a)(v) (2007) (immunizing 
healthcare institutions that decline to follow an advance directive which “is contrary to . . . the written 
policies of the institution”). 
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alter the category of exempted entity. But in a number of states and with 
regard to most procedures other than abortion, statutes expressly apply only 
to institutions that refuse care for religious or moral reasons.171 And as Part I 
showed, institutions—ranging from formerly Catholic for-profits to secular 
partners of Catholic healthcare—refuse services due instead to their 
contractual obligations. 
Consider Highline Medical Center in Washington State, which 
remained secular following its acquisition by Catholic Franciscan but 
discontinued religiously restricted reproductive and end-of-life services.172 
Under Washington law, healthcare facilities may not be required “to 
participate in the provision of . . . [any] specific service if they object to so 
doing for reason of conscience or religion.”173 The law makes clear that it is 
balancing the accommodation of providers’ objections against a public 
policy goal of ensuring patients’ timely access to health services.174 A 
contractual commitment to religious compliance should not suffice to 
counterbalance patients’ rights to care and to render the institution eligible 
for exemption under laws that specify religious or moral objections. Yet the 
contracting parties seem to take it to do just that. 
Whether the exception swallows the rule may depend in part on the 
form the exemption takes: in other words, whether it is granted by statute, 
regulation, or the courts. Statutory exemptions may be especially likely to 
 
 171 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(B) (2017) (allowing refusal of abortion, emergency 
contraception, or “any medication or device intended to inhibit or prevent implantation of a fertilized 
ovum” based “on moral or religious grounds”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(d) (1988) (with regard to 
abortions, a medical facility is not required to act against “its conscience”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 
(1975) (specifying that abortion refusal must be based on “personal, ethical, moral or religious grounds”). 
 In the majority of states, refusal to comply with a directive or instruction at the end of life requires 
reasons of conscience. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-6-109(c) (2013) (“A healthcare institution may 
decline to comply with an individual instruction or healthcare decision if the instruction or decision . . . 
[i]s contrary to a policy of the institution that is based on reasons of conscience . . . .”). For near-identical 
language, see ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1) (2014); 
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734 (b) (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508(e) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 327E-7(e) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 (2012); IND. CODE § 30-5-9-10(2) (1991); ME. STAT. tit. 18-
A, § 5-807(e) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 5-613 (LexisNexis 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 201D, § 14 (1990); MO. REV. STAT. § 404.830(1) (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(E) (2015); 
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5424(a) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808 (2004); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 9713(c)(3) (2018). 
 172 Ostrom, supra note 43 (quoting Highline CEO Mark Benedum as saying his hospital will remain 
secular but align its ethics policies with Franciscan’s). Another example in Washington is Providence 
Health’s affiliation with Swedish, which then cut abortions at all five of its hospitals. Carol M. Ostrom, 
Swedish Alliance with Providence Is Now Complete, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012, 11:32 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/swedish-alliance-with-providence-is-now-complete 
[https://perma.cc/BE4E-SZS7]. 
 173 WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065(2)(a) (2017). 
 174 Id. § 48.43.065(1), (2)(b). For a similar framework, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 (2017). 
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grow because institutions can effectively claim them sub silentio. For 
example, a hospital may benefit from exemption through a conscience law 
without notifying the state. Some laws even seem to contemplate that 
contract will create religious identity sufficient for exemption from 
otherwise applicable law. For example, Utah’s recent nondiscrimination law 
exempts from housing and employment nondiscrimination an affiliate of a 
religious organization, defined in part by contract.175 Legislators, however, 
may not have appreciated the extent to which religious organizations contract 
for religious compliance. 
Regulatory exemptions may also apply broadly. Consider, for example, 
that the IRS regularly issues church plan exemptions to nonchurch affiliates, 
including those that encompass secular entities, and until recently did not 
require employers to notify their employees of a change to church plan 
status.176 Another example can be found in the contraceptive coverage 
regulations issued following Hobby Lobby. Under those regulations, “any 
for-profit entity that is controlled directly or indirectly by a nonprofit eligible 
organization” could claim a religious accommodation from the contraceptive 
mandate.177 This interpretation could mean that for-profit entities created 
through a joint venture between a for-profit investor and a religious entity 
could claim accommodation (or be required to do so through contract). Any 
such for-profit entity could qualify for religious accommodation by virtue of 
its mere connection to a religious nonprofit entity. 
Seeking exemption under RFRA, by contrast, requires an institution to 
more visibly declare its religious beliefs. Some of the new purportedly 
religious institutions—such as the investor-owned but Catholic-affiliated 
hospitals—may be willing to do just that. Of course, sometimes, having to 
identify as religious may function as a market check on exemption.178 At 
 
 175 An affiliate is defined as “a person that directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries 
controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with” the religious organization. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 16-6a-102 (Lexis 2017). “Control” in turn can be established through “contract” that allows “the 
direct or indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of an entity.” Id. § 16-6a-102(10). Contract plays an explicit role in Utah’s housing nondiscrimination 
statute, which specifies that it will not apply to housing “owned by, operated by, or under contract with 
an affiliate” of a religious organization or “owned by or operated by a person under contract” with a 
religious organization. Id. § 57-21-3(2)(b)(ii)-(iv) (Lexis 2015). 
 176 Stein, supra note 154. 
 177 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and the Affordable Care 
Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,326 (July 14, 2015). 
 178 Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 735 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While public religious 
identification will no doubt attract some . . . to the institution, it will dissuade others. In other words, it 
comes at a cost. Such market responses will act as a check on institutions that falsely identify themselves 
as religious merely to obtain . . . exemption . . . .” (quoting Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 
1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
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other times, however, market incentives may cut in favor of asserting 
religious identity and demanding exemption. Given that the public may not 
follow litigation closely,179 the calculus may depend on the dollar value of 
exemption. Moreover, the cost of identifying as religious is likely to be 
fleeting; for example, consumers may refrain from shopping at Hobby Lobby 
in the near term but return as its notoriety wanes. 
Once accommodated, an institution may remain accommodated. 
Corporate religious identity and exemption may live on eternally in zombie 
religious institutions, despite the absence of an association of religious 
people or discernible religious message. This possibility countermands the 
assumption that a small, discrete set of religious objectors exists. 
Such a fate seems even more likely with regard to judicial exemptions. 
With legislative protections, a corporation might become ineligible to claim 
exemption (for instance, if the statute required nonprofit status). Courts, by 
contrast, are unlikely to be called upon to revisit a decision granting religious 
exemption. Through inertia, judicial accommodation may endure even as the 
company changes hands. Nor, under Hobby Lobby, is it evident that a change 
in organization or ownership would divest the corporation of its religious 
identity. Religious exemption could be perpetual for RFRA purposes. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Proponents of religious institutionalism might welcome the spread of 
religion through contract. Some might hold principled positions against the 
legal requirements, for example, to offer emergency contraception or to not 
discriminate on the basis of religion. They might thus applaud the way in 
which contracted-for religion undercuts those policies. However, as the next 
Part shows, contracted-for religious compliance belies the values of 
pluralism and voluntarism that religious institutions purport to embody. 
III. DESTABILIZING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM 
In theory and doctrine, religious institutionalism calls for a sphere of 
immunity of religious institutions from state interference. This “freedom of 
the church” grants religious institutions special status in the social order to 
govern their affairs and to define their own boundaries, as Section III.A 
 
 179 Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 517 n.172 
(2012) (“[C]onsidering such market concerns by organizations would seem to assume that individual 
consumers or employees actually pay attention to litigation.”); see also Brandon S. Boulter, Goldilocks 
and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization Exemption of 
Title VII, 2011 BYU L. REV. 33, 44 (“This may allow secular entities to redefine themselves as ‘religious’ 
and thereby receive undeserved exemption from certain requirements of Title VII . . . .”). 
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describes. Proponents of religious institutionalism base their claims to broad 
institutional autonomy on values of pluralism and voluntarism. According to 
this view, robust institutional protection leads to the flourishing of diverse 
institutions, alternative sources of authority, and individual liberty. 
Extended into the commercial realm, however, religious 
institutionalism loses its theoretical grounding. Autonomy for commercial 
actors from generally applicable laws is unlikely to foster pluralism or 
nourish individual free exercise. As Section III.B explains, wealthy religious 
entities can instead corner the market on religious compliance, driving out 
other religious groups and secular options. Section III.C argues that 
voluntarism also proves elusive once religious institutionalism spreads into 
commerce. Fundamentally, Section III.D contends, as institutions 
characterized by disparate goals, membership, and organizational forms 
adopt religious identity and seek exemption, they put epistemic pressure on 
the category of religious institution. Under such circumstances, the realm of 
institutional autonomy may shrink rather than swell. The rise of zombie 
religious institutions may require culling back religious exemptions in courts 
and legislatures. 
A. The Freedom of the Church 
Religious institutions have long been understood to advance and 
safeguard religious liberty. In traditional liberal theory, their rights of free 
exercise are understood in associational terms. Institutions enjoy rights by 
virtue of aggregating and advancing the consciences of individuals.180 
Churches foster and encourage individual free exercise by congregants who 
voluntarily join. Echoing this theory, the Supreme Court has previously 
taken the perspective that individual religious freedom flourishes where 
church affiliates exercise religion.181 
In recent years, however, religious liberty doctrine and theory have 
taken a distinctly institutional turn. In its 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision, the 
Supreme Court decided that religious institutions need not comply with 
antidiscrimination law when it comes to employees who are ministers—
recognizing a doctrine known as the “ministerial exception” under the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.182 Carving 
out a sphere free from regulation, the Court emphasized institutional freedom 
 
 180 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 181 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 182 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012); see supra note 113. 
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rather than the associational interests of religious individuals.183 While 
Hosanna-Tabor is the high-water mark of religious institutionalism, a 
number of the Court’s recent religious liberty cases reflect a focus on 
institutional autonomy.184 Legal scholars similarly argue that institutions—
not individuals—lie at the core of the First Amendment.185 
By contrast to traditional liberal theory, this new religious 
institutionalism claims a near-absolute or presumptive autonomy of religious 
institutions from regulation.186 Religious institutionalists claim that religious 
entities require exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, insurance 
mandates, and hospital regulations under constitutional doctrine and 
statutory regimes.187 From this perspective, legislative exemptions of 
religious institutions reflect their entitlement to independence in their own 
affairs. 
Religious institutionalists base their claims to broad institutional 
autonomy on values of pluralism and voluntarism.188 In contrast to the 
impersonal ties of state authority, religious institutions are thought to form 
 
 183 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184 (“By forbidding the ‘establishment of religion’ and guaranteeing 
the ‘free exercise thereof,’ the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government—unlike the 
English Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents 
the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with 
the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”). 
 184 See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (regarding nonprofit employer challenge to 
contraceptive mandate); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (regarding for-
profit employer challenge to contraceptive mandate); see also B. Jessie Hill, Kingdom Without End? The 
Inevitable Expansion of Religious Sovereignty Claims, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2017) 
(arguing that Hosanna-Tabor, Hobby Lobby, and Zubik are “united by a common thread of argument—
namely, that religious institutions, because of their religious identity, are to some extent immune from 
regulation by the secular state”). 
 185 See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 293 (“[A]n appropriately institutional approach to the Religion 
Clauses would involve attention to the religious-freedom rights of religious entities.”); Paul Horwitz, 
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 
109 (2009). 
 186 See supra note 8 (compiling sources). 
 187 DeBoer, supra note 33, at 1609 (“[R]eligious hospitals should be sheltered from the destructive 
force of taxation, the controlling influence of government, and the backdoor regulation of government.”); 
Richard W. Garnett et al., How to Protect Endangered Religious Groups You Admire, CHRISTIANITY 
TODAY (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2015/august-web-only/how-to-protect-
endangered-religious-groups-you-admire.html [https://perma.cc/MJ3G-KC49] (arguing in favor of the 
First Amendment Defense Act which would exempt nonprofit organizations receiving federal funding 
from requirements of nondiscrimination). 
 188  Garnett, supra note 6, at 273; Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An 
Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33, 42 (2013) (observing that 
“‘freedom of the church’ . . . is a pluralistic claim”); Horwitz, supra note 185, at 104–09 (arguing that 
“sphere sovereignty offers an especially full and persuasive account of religious entities as First 
Amendment institutions”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
966 
through organic, personal connections.189 They foster pluralism, offering a 
sphere of authority separate and perhaps coequal to the state. 
Religious institutionalists stress that autonomy from state interference 
leads to pluralism in two senses. First, they expect diverse perspectives 
among people and institutions. The results of religious institutionalism are 
“healthy, independent, free, diverse institutions”190 and “a profusion of 
organically developed institutions and associations.”191 Even among for-
profit corporations, some argue, “moral pluralism” becomes possible 
through exemption from state regulation.192 On this view, minimizing 
regulation of religious institutions proves socially valuable not only in 
reducing conflict, but also in encouraging religious and secular views 
separate from the state.193 As Professor Angela Carmella puts it, 
“[e]xemptions may be fully consistent with the state’s public order function 
and the larger common good, particularly when they allow institutions in 
civil society to engage in socially responsible, stabilizing and beneficial 
activities.”194 In healthcare in particular, “the institutional autonomy of 
religious hospitals” should generate societal benefits in the form of 
“divergent organizational identities.”195 To fail to grant religious autonomy 
to religious entities, by contrast, allows for a totalizing state and limits 
associational diversity. 
Religious institutionalism embraces pluralism in a second sense, as 
sources of authority independent from the secular political authority, whose 
reach then is necessarily limited.196 This view of authority is quite robust on 
some perspectives. As Professor Richard Garnett describes it, religious 
institutions “exercise within the area of their competence an authority so 
 
 189 JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 149 (1996) (“The church is usually viewed as a 
kind of unified whole, different from the sum of its parts. The glue that holds it together is not 
contractual.”). 
 190 Garnett, supra note 6, at 293. 
 191 Horwitz, supra note 185, at 84. 
 192 Robert K. Vischer, Individual Rights vs. Institutional Identity: The Relational Dimension of 
Conscience in Health Care, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 67, 68, 73–74 (2010) [hereinafter Vischer, Individual 
Rights]. 
 193 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons 
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1677 (“The diversity of religious beliefs . . . presupposes a diversity 
of religious communities, each of which is able to structure its own internal life according to its own 
unique religious views and perspectives.”). 
 194 Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal 
Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 408 (2007). 
 195 Vischer, Individual Rights, supra note 192, at 78–79. 
 196 Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 998 (1991) 
(discussing question of “why the state should recognize the juridical dignity of other legal orders” and 
vice versa). 
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effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority.”197 From this 
perspective, institutional exemptions—whether judicial or legislative—
promote values of institutional self-definition. They also may serve 
antiestablishment values, maintaining a wall of separation between church 
and state.198 Civil society becomes populated with religious organizations as 
a counterweight to the government. 
Religious institutionalism also emphasizes voluntarism. On this view, 
freedom for religious institutions furthers the religious exercise of 
individuals because it protects their voluntary decisions to enter (or exit) 
such communities.199 Without “churches” defined to encompass an array of 
nonstate actors, individuals lack meaningful freedom of conscience.200 
Religious institutions accordingly mediate between individuals and the 
 
 197 Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation, 
Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 503–04 (2015) (quoting Mark DeWolfe Howe, 
The Supreme Court, 1952 Term¾Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. 
REV. 91, 91 (1953)); see also Thomas Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church–State Separation, and the 
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 176 (2011) (“The civil authority—that is, the 
authority of a constitutional government—lacks ‘competence’ to intervene in such questions, not so much 
because they lie beyond its technical or intellectual capacity, but because they lie beyond its 
jurisdiction.”). 
 198 For example, Congress exempted church plans from ERISA in part because the examination of a 
church’s books might be regarded as “an unjustified invasion of the confidential relationship that is 
believed to be appropriate with regard to churches and their religious activities.” S. REP. No. 93-383, at 
160 (1973). 
 199 Angela C. Carmella, After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious For-Profit” and the Limits of the 
Autonomy Doctrine, 80 MO. L. REV. 381, 416 (2015) [hereinafter Carmella, After Hobby Lobby]; see 
also Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 228 (2014) (“[V]oluntariness 
must at least mean that individuals know that they are entering into a religious institution and that they 
can exit at will.”). 
 200 See Angela C. Carmella, Mary Ann Glendon on Religious Liberty: The Social Nature of the 
Person and the Public Nature of Religion, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1191, 1211–12 (1998) (stating that 
“protecting religious freedom in part through the prohibition on religious establishments ensures that 
religious associations are free from governmental control so that religious choice is ‘both possible and 
meaningful’”); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy 
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 532 (2007) (arguing that religious freedom for any 
individual depends on “a civil-society landscape that is thick with churches (and mediating institutions 
and associations of all kinds) and by legal rules that acknowledge and capture their importance”); Vischer, 
Individual Rights, supra note 192, at 73 (calling “institutional liberty . . . essential for the long-term 
flourishing of conscience”). 
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state.201 They ensure the robust protection of individual religious exercise202 
and act as bulwarks against an overweening state.203 
In classic liberal theory, churches are characterized by free and 
voluntary choices of individuals to join together.204 Religious institutionalism 
sounds in this republican theory,205 but it differs in that it describes an 
institution as “more than the sum of its parts.”206 According to this claim, 
religious institutions have intrinsic as well as instrumental value and prove 
uniquely able to protect individual conscience through their independent and 
autonomous existence.207 Their autonomy proves distinguishable from the 
rights of the individuals who constitute the whole. Religious institutions thus 
are not just like other associations but play a distinctive role in the social 
order. 
While they often describe their theory as “freedom of the church,” 
proponents of institutional autonomy have always included a broader 
category of entities—including charities and, typically, healthcare 
providers—within the scope of religious institutional autonomy. Hosanna-
Tabor, for example, emphasized the autonomy of a “church” but did so in 
the case of a school.208 Courts have held that the ministerial exception applies 
 
 201 See, e.g., GARVEY, supra note 189, at 153 (“Religious groups are one of the most important of 
those associations that stand intermediate between the individual and the state, and provide a buffer that 
is the best protection for personal freedom . . . .”); Horwitz, supra note 185, at 83 (“These institutions 
serve as a counterweight to the state, ensuring that it ‘may never become an octopus, which stifles the 
whole of life.’” (quoting ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 96 (photo. reprint 1999) (1931))); 
see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 199 (2012) (Alito, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he autonomy of religious groups, both here in the United States and abroad, has often 
served as a shield against oppressive civil laws.”). 
 202 Robinson, supra note 199, at 213 (“[R]eligious institutions facilitate religious individuals’ 
exercise of their First Amendment liberties. In this way, religious institutions act as intermediaries and 
hold rights only for the purpose of promoting individual liberties and ensuring the protection of individual 
interests.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 295 (“It remains the case, though, that the existence and 
independence of religious institutions—self-defining, self-governing, self-directing institutions—are 
needed, as John Courtney Murray put it, to ‘check the encroachments of secular power and preserve [the] 
immunities’ of our ‘basic human things.’” (alteration in original) (quoting JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, 
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 204 (1960))). 
 204 See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28 (James H. Tully ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co., 1983) (1689). 
 205 But see Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 8, at 22–23 (criticizing the use of republican theory 
as “misplaced” given republicans’ deep skepticism of hierarchical corporate institutions including 
churches). 
 206 Robinson, supra note 199, at 217. 
 207 Horwitz, supra note 185, at 121 (“Religious entities are protected as a part of the social landscape 
not simply because they are instrumentally valuable, but because they are intrinsically valuable, and a 
fundamental part of a legally pluralistic society.”). 
 208 565 U.S. 171, 190–94 (2012). 
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to hospitals, nursing homes, social service providers, and beyond.209 Entities 
removed from the core “church” have benefited from judicial deference to 
claims of religious identity and entitlement to statutory exemption.210 As 
Professor Jessie Hill argues, “advocates of robust sovereignty for religious 
institutions are generally not eager to set out clear limits on that sovereignty, 
and indeed, most of them have not done so.”211 Instead, the theory holds, 
religious institutions have the authority to determine their own boundaries 
and to define themselves independent from the state.212 
Once religious institutionalism extends into commerce, however, 
principles of pluralism, voluntarism, and self-definition founder. As the next 
Sections show, contracted-for religion and the zombies it generates impede 
diverse organizations and sources of authority, coerce individuals, and 
threaten any special status religious entities once had. 
B. Religious Market Dominance 
The experience of religious institutions in healthcare flies in the face of 
pluralism as a justification for religious institutionalism. Contracting religion 
can result in hegemony. The most powerful business can use its market 
position to propagate its faith to the detriment of institutional pluralism. 
Institutions—both religious and secular—can converge toward religious 
doctrine through commerce, not conversion. Unlike churches that actively 
and authoritatively interpret moral values, these institutions may passively 
comply with contract. 
Like religious institutionalists, some healthcare scholars have expressed 
concerns that state regulation and market forces are totalizing with regard to 
religious institutions. Exploring isomorphism in the healthcare industry, 
scholars have long noted that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals come to adopt 
similar missions and characteristics.213 And ownership changes through 
 
 209 See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 2007) (precluding 
ADA claims of resident in clinical pastoral education program in hospital); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew 
Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309–11 (4th Cir. 2004) (preventing kosher supervisor from 
proceeding with Fair Labor Standards Act wage claim against Jewish nursing home); EEOC v. Catholic 
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (barring sex discrimination claim under Title VII); 
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (barring hospital 
chaplain’s sex and age discrimination claims). 
 210 See infra notes 281–84 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA church plan exemptions). 
 211 Hill, supra note 184, at 1195. 
 212 See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 295 (describing religious institutions as “self-defining, self-
governing, self-directing institutions”). 
 213 White, supra note 41, at 214 (“According to many observers, this metamorphosis of the Catholic 
health care tradition has yielded organizations that more closely resemble other nonprofit and/or for-profit 
health care providers.”). 
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mergers and acquisitions can drive such convergence.214 The scholarly 
literature frequently notes that religious nonprofits might lose their special 
nature as they become like secular for-profits.215 Professor Kathleen 
Boozang, for example, has argued that cost control mechanisms, 
competition, regulation, and affiliation pressures “threaten[ed] to diminish, 
if not completely erode, the ability of sectarian hospitals and nursing homes 
to maintain control over the kinds of medical care that they provide.”216 
Convergence, scholars have assumed, runs only in one direction. 
But, as Part I suggested, Catholic healthcare has enjoyed considerable 
financial success in a consolidating market. Between 2001 and 2016, as the 
number of acute care hospitals dropped by 6%, the number of Catholic-
owned or -affiliated acute care hospitals increased by 22%.217 In buying and 
selling, Catholic healthcare systems have populated the market with secular 
healthcare entities subject to Catholic restrictions. 
For other religious healthcare providers, affiliations with Catholic 
healthcare frequently prove totalizing, even when they initially purport not 
to be. For example, in 2005, in what was heralded as “a rare union of Catholic 
and Jewish healthcare providers,” Caritas Health Services and Jewish 
Hospital HealthCare Services formed a joint venture whose terms, drafted 
by a Jewish rabbi and a Catholic theologian, purported to maintain the 
religious traditions of each.218 The Catholic hospitals would remain Catholic 
and subject to the ERDs, and the Jewish hospitals would retain their religious 
values.219 Subsequently, the new entity merged again, forming KentuckyOne 
Health, which agreed to continue the facilities’ respective religious identities 
in a way that “honors the rich Jewish and Catholic heritages of its two 
sponsors.”220 Immediately, however, the Jewish facilities and the many 
affiliated physician groups (including some of Louisville’s largest obstetrics 
and gynecology (OB–GYN) practices) received a memo that, on “Day One” 
 
 214 Guy David, The Convergence Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals in the United States, 
9 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 403, 422 (2009). 
 215 White, supra note 41, at 231 (“If Catholic health care is to survive the uncertainty and radical 
changes that are occurring in the architecture of health care delivery, more resources must be invested in 
the services they deliver in order to clarify the ways in which they are distinctive.”). 
 216 Boozang, supra note 37, at 1430–31. 
 217 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 16, at 3; see also Nina Martin, The Growth of Catholic Hospitals, 
By the Numbers, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-growth-
of-catholic-hospitals-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/NA7X-SXZP] (noting that since 2011, the largest 
Catholic hospital networks have grown at least another 30%). 
 218 Melanie Evans, Catholic Jewish Deal in Ky., MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 10, 2005, at 14, 14. 
 219 Id. 
 220 JHSMH & SJHS Merge, KENTUCKYONE HEALTH (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.kentuckyonehealth.org/body.cfm?id=18&action=detail&ref=174 [https://perma.cc/U6GL-
BYH5]. 
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of the merger, they must cease providing contraception, tubal ligations, 
vasectomies, and techniques commonly used for abortion and miscarriage 
management, unless permissible under Catholic doctrine.221 
Like other religious perspectives, secular options may be excluded from 
the market. In Lane County, Oregon, for example, the Catholic health system 
holds 70% of the hospital market and has affiliations with a large but 
unknown percentage of physician groups that restrict care in accordance with 
doctrine.222 In Bartlesville, Oklahoma, when Ascension acquired the one 
hospital in the city, it required its affiliated physicians (all but one OB–GYN) 
to cease prescribing contraceptives—a policy it walked back substantially 
after public outcry.223 
Negotiated agreements for religiously restricted care may have had a 
significant but unappreciated effect on access to healthcare—reproductive 
and end-of-life care in particular. Granted, exemption of officially 
designated Catholic hospitals already decreases access to care. But the 
perpetuity of restrictions and their application to nonobjecting partner 
institutions suggest that access to contested care (abortion in particular) may 
be more severely limited than previously thought. Indeed, a recent empirical 
study found that when a secular hospital affiliates with a Catholic entity 
(whether it remains secular or not), the provision of reproductive healthcare 
is significantly affected.224 Looking at inpatient discharge data in six high-
population states, researchers found that Catholic affiliation reduced tubal 
ligations by 31%.225 If we only look at Catholic institutions—though they are 
many—we may dramatically undercount the reach of religious restrictions. 
Admittedly, for some religious institutionalists, the ideal is a dominant 
Church. But they predict a Church that dominates by virtue of conviction or 
at least tradition.226 With regard to secular affiliates and zombie religious 
 
 221 Memorandum to Clinical Operations (ED, OR, Nursing, Pharmacy) Employees, Managers, 
Jewish Hosp. & St. Mary’s HealthCare, Saint Joseph Health System, & Univ. of Louisville Hosp., Day 
One of Kentucky Newco – Fact Sheet (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.khpi.org/dwnlds/2012/day-one-
newco.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKH7-GCG5]; Laura Ungar, Louisville Medical Practice Leaves 




 222 Ikemoto, supra note 72, at 1102 n.84. 
 223 St. John Responds to Outcry, EXAMINER-ENTERPRISE (Apr. 1, 2014, 9:21 AM), http://examiner-
enterprise.com/news/local-news/st-john-responds-outcry [https://perma.cc/QG4G-2CEM]. 
 224 Hill et al., supra note 70, at 6–7 (broadly defining a hospital as Catholic if the hospital itself is 
designated Catholic, its ownership is Catholic, or the hospital’s system is Catholic). 
 225 Id. at 13. 
 226 Vischer, Individual Rights, supra note 192, at 74 (“[T]he moral marketplace enlists actors in an 
ongoing conversation—and in a real sense, competition—regarding the good.”). 
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institutions, the religious entity does not persuade. Compliance results from 
the institution’s economic strength. 
Contracting for religion also challenges the second sense of pluralism 
urged by religious institutionalism—that is, of juridical authority separate 
from the state. Affiliates of Catholic healthcare and zombie Catholic 
hospitals do not represent the exercise of autonomous lawmaking that 
religious institutionalism celebrates. They simply follow rules in order to 
avoid breach of contract. Compliance with contract terms offers little ability 
to evolve and to interpret and apply religious authority in context. While 
officially designated, traditional Catholic hospitals have experts to answer 
ethical dilemmas or advocate for enhanced charitable care, affiliates and 
zombie hospitals adhere to contract in a formalistic way. 
Indeed, the authority of established religious churches may even be 
undermined by zombie hospitals in ways that religious institutionalists 
would find troubling. Dignity Health, for example, denominates itself as 
Catholic even though the institutional Church disagrees.227 Its St. Joseph 
hospital in Phoenix asserts Catholic identity despite revocation of Catholic 
status by the local bishop.228 
In sum, the dominance of Catholic doctrine manifests not success in 
convincing people of its vision of the good life, but financial inducement to 
religious adherence. The result is a religiously homogenous market in which 
the flourishing of diverse alternative sources of authority goes unrealized. 
C. Involuntary Associations 
Contract, of course, can be a way of recognizing and affirming common 
beliefs and shared commitments. Scholars regularly point to contract as a 
mark of voluntarism in relationships between commercial religious entities 
and employees.229 Sometimes, they further argue that commercial firms 
function like traditional voluntary organizations, allowing employees to 
associate around a common goal—religious or not.230 
Contract backed by threat of civil action, however, is not the hallmark 
of people united by shared religious belief. It again indicates problems for 
institutional autonomy in the commercial realm, where an entity can 
 
 227 See Press Release, Catholic Healthcare W., supra note 99. 
 228 See Press Release, St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., supra note 98. 
 229 Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 570 (2015) (stating that “religious institutionalism amounts to a constitutionally 
protected contract of sorts” founded on “the voluntary choice of individuals to join the religious 
institution”). 
 230 Id. at 570–71 (“[W]hile the law generally does not allow individuals to waive certain statutorily 
protected rights, members are granted the constitutional authority to do so when it comes to joining 
religious institutions in order to promote the value of religious voluntarism.”). 
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purchase compliance with its authority instead of winning over constituents. 
The role of the dead hand in institutions to which ties have been cut proves 
particularly disturbing from the perspective of voluntarism. Sales contracts 
precommit a whole range of people to religious doctrine. Even if we were to 
assume that the original signatories shared the seller’s religious beliefs, 
future providers, administrators, owners, and patients are unlikely to do so. 
Contracts requiring adherence to religious doctrine affect three groups: 
business entities, individual healthcare providers, and patients. As to the first, 
administrators of Catholic health systems describe transactions with other 
healthcare entities with the rhetoric of voluntary choice and value alignment. 
From their perspective, buyers of Catholic hospitals are “groups who agree 
with us and wish to continue the type of care and types of policies” that 
Catholic systems require.231 As the former president of the Catholic Health 
Association put it, “When you choose us, you choose who we are.”232 
Deals between sophisticated corporate healthcare chains, however, bear 
little resemblance to an association based on shared values. As a conceptual 
matter, thinking of corporate consolidations as voluntary associations 
requires a move from aggregates of individuals to aggregates of entities. Ties 
between institutions are not affective, but detached, requiring “external 
coercion or inducement”—that is, legal enforcement and financial 
payment.233 As a pragmatic matter, as an executive of Tenet Healthcare said, 
buyers of Catholic-run hospitals have no choice but to accept the 
directives.234 Catholic sellers will not consider their offers without such 
commitment.235 
Moreover, exit is constrained by threat of legal enforcement in a way 
that belies comparisons to voluntary associations. Recall, for example, the 
Caritas-Cerberus deal and its $25 million liquidated damages clause meant 
to keep the for-profit owner of the formerly Catholic chain compliant with 
doctrine.236 The difficulty of exit also is apparent from transactions between 
Catholic and non-Catholic healthcare that went sour. For example, the 
 
 231 FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5 (quoting Karen Brandon, Ex-Catholic Hospitals Retain Restrictions, 
CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 17, 2002). 
 232 Deanna Bellandi, What Hospitals Won’t Do for a Merger, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 29, 1998, 
at 28, 28 (quoting Rev. Michael Place, president of the Catholic Health Association). 
 233 James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1579–81 
(differentiating between individuals’ identification with or detachment from an institution and arguing 
that “to secure compliance with the expectations that accompany a role distant from the self, that role 
must be accompanied by some sort of external coercion or inducement”). 
 234 FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See Caritas Christi Massachusetts Attorney General Statement, supra note 75, and accompanying 
text. 
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unwinding of the consortium of city-affiliated Bayfront Hospital with 
Catholic partners led to multiple lawsuits.237 In another instance, Catholic and 
Lutheran hospitals in Denver formed the Exempla system pursuant to a joint 
operating agreement. Neither could exit unless all parties agreed to 
dissolution of the corporate structure.238 Ten years later, an intractable 
conflict occurred. As the agreement allowed, Lutheran was not compliant 
with Catholic doctrine and provided a full range of end-of-life and 
reproductive care,239 but as a result the Catholic partner refused to invest in 
facilities upgrades for the system.240 After years of litigation, Lutheran finally 
succumbed, and Exempla became a fully Catholic system.241 
At the provider level, contract similarly substitutes for shared faith as 
the primary mechanism of compliance. Through leases, admitting privilege 
agreements, employment contracts, and purchase agreements, healthcare 
systems require physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers to restrict 
the care they provide patients based on religious positions they may not 
share.242 Restrictions affect a large percentage of physicians.243 
The use of contract seems to reflect a particular lack of alignment 
between providers and institutions. Twenty percent of physicians who 
practice at religious hospitals244 and a full fifty-two percent of OB–GYNs 
who work in officially designated Catholic hospitals report conflicts over 
 
 237 Allison & Gilmer, supra note 48. 
 238 Cinda Becker, Exempla Board Opposes Deal, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 29, 2007, at 8, 8. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Joe Carlson, Offering Salvation: Ascension, Equity Firm Forge Deal They Say Could Save 
Catholic Hospitals, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20110221/MAGAZINE/110219947 [https://perma.cc/TJ9V-PTK8]. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See, e.g., ERDs, supra note 20, at 12 (“Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives 
as policy [and] require adherence to them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and 
employment . . . .”); Ungar, supra note 221 (describing a physician group departure from a healthy system 
after the purchase agreement resulted in religious restrictions on birth control); ELENA N. COHEN & 
ALISON SCLATER, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENT., TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES: USING CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAWS TO EXPOSE INSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON REPRODUCTIVE AND OTHER HEALTH 
CARE 6 (2003), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/TruthOrConsequences2003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XGM9-QQ6Y] (“Catholic-owned medical office buildings sometimes require 
physicians to whom they lease to honor the Directives in those private physician offices, even though the 
physicians do not have any other relationship with the Catholic entity.”). 
 243 Forty-three percent of physicians report having practiced in an officially religiously affiliated 
institution over the course of their careers, a large number of which had institutional policies of refusal. 
Debra B. Stulberg et al., Religious Hospitals and Primary Care Physicians: Conflicts over Policies for 
Patient Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 725, 727 (2010). 
 244 Some religious hospitals do not impose restrictions; this number, therefore, may understate the 
occurrence of conflicts between physicians and refusing hospitals over religious restrictions. Id. 
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religion-based policies for patient care.245 Empirical studies show that such 
disagreement persists irrespective of shared faith.246 That is, the rates of 
conflict of a Catholic physician and a non-Catholic physician with a Catholic 
hospital were approximately the same. 
Frequently, providers do not knowingly or voluntarily seek work in 
Catholic healthcare settings. In interviews in a 2010 study, OB–GYNs 
reported that practice restrictions on the provision of abortion were not made 
clear to them at the time of their hiring.247 Myriad examples of physicians 
leading protests against Catholic acquisitions show providers encountering 
religious restrictions in the context of consolidation.248 
Lack of transparency in transactions between Catholic and non-
Catholic entities undermines the notion that providers voluntarily embrace 
Catholic restrictions. In many deals between Catholic hospitals and secular 
corporations, terms went undisclosed.249 In some cases, administrators 
proved unwilling to clarify which services were affected, even after a sale.250 
In numerous instances, institutions assured providers and the public that 
services would continue only to subsequently limit them in accordance with 
religious doctrine.251 Even where the terms of the agreement were made clear, 
the Catholic contracting party (at least theoretically) could change the 
religious terms unilaterally, because agreements typically call for adherence 
to future amendments to, or new interpretations of, the directives.252 
 
 245 Debra B. Stulberg et al., Obstetrician–Gynecologists, Religious Institutions, and Conflicts 
Regarding Patient-Care Policies, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 73.e1, 73.e4 (2012). 
 246 Stulberg et al., supra note 243, at 728 (“Neither religious affiliation nor physician-institution 
congruence was significantly associated with having experienced conflict with religiously affiliated 
institutions.”). 
 247 Lori Freedman et al., Obstacles to the Integration of Abortion into Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Practice, 42 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 146, 148–50 (2010) (summarizing qualitative 
interviews with thirty OB–GYNs). 
 248 See, e.g., Fogel & Rivera, supra note 72, at 725–26 (discussing the purchase of the sole 
community hospital in Gilroy, California, by Catholic Healthcare West in response to which physicians 
“organized, wrote letters to the editor, voted as a hospital staff to preserve sterilizations, and even 
appealed directly to the Bishop”). 
 249 See REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 60, at 10 (describing the 
complicated “evolution of the University’s explanation of to what degree the Hospital will be subject to 
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& Gilmer, supra note 48 (discussing the lack of notice to the city of terms of the consortium agreement 
between a Catholic and quasi-public hospital); Mueller, supra note 155 (reporting that former hospital 
employees were surprised to find that the buyer had not continued to fund their pension plans). 
 250 See, e.g., Ungar, supra note 221 (reporting that physicians were refused specific answers to their 
questions about restrictions on care and could receive no assurance that they could continue to provide 
services). 
 251 See, e.g., Cowan, supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 252 FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5 (“The Asset Purchase Agreement for Santa Marta Hospital required 
compliance with certain of the Directives, as now approved by the National Conference of Catholic 
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Likewise, in converting pensions to ERISA-exempt church plans, 
hospitals and healthcare systems failed to notify the estimated tens of 
thousands of workers who thereby lost federal protections.253 They did not 
seek employee ratification of the decisions. For example, the Hospital Center 
at Orange—the last remaining hospital in a New Jersey city that once had 
three—served as a secular community hospital for over 100 years.254 In 1998, 
it became an affiliate of Catholic Cathedral Health System.255 In 2002, the 
system applied for and received an IRS ruling converting the employee 
pension plan to a church plan.256 It thus frustrated long-established 
expectations, including those of workers who likely accepted lower wages 
in return for a pension only to see it disappear.257 
With regard to patients, theories of voluntarism prove particularly 
strained. An assumption of religious exemption (and indeed of religious 
institutionalism generally) has been that one had to choose to encounter 
religious institutions. As Professor Robert Vischer summarizes, “Churches, 
when viewed from the perch of state agnosticism, are optional pursuits. They 
do not govern access to wide swaths of employment or essential goods and 
services . . . .”258 From the liberal perspective as well, as Professors Richard 
Schragger and Micah Schwartzman explain, “it is the very inconsequentiality 
of the church for the political and social status of its members that allows it 
to be so fully autonomous and free from state regulation.”259 
By contrast to churches, healthcare institutions—religiously affiliated 
or not—serve to meet urgent and emergent human needs and operate in a 
field flush with federal and state funds. Hospital markets in particular lack 
competitiveness. As a result of mergers and the formation of massive 
healthcare systems, nearly half of hospital markets are highly concentrated 
 
Bishops, and as interpreted by the local Bishop, together with all amendments thereto from time-to-time 
hereafter.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 253 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 158 (reporting that employees at the Hospital Center at Orange were 
not notified when the I.R.S. issued a ruling recognizing the hospital’s pension as a “church plan”). Only 
in 2011 did the IRS begin to require employers to notify employees of applications for church plan status. 
Rev. Proc. 2011-44, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446. 
 254  Workers Covered by Church Plans Tell Their Stories, PENSION RTS. CTR., 
http://www.pensionrights.org/publications/fact-sheet/workers-covered-church-plans-tell-their-stories 
[https://perma.cc/7YEG-3UR4 ]. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Walsh, supra note 158. 
 257PENSION RTS. CTR., supra note 254. 
 258 Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 369, 391 (2013) [hereinafter Vischer, For-Profit Businesses]. 
 259 Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 
917, 961–62 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
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(uncompetitive) and none is highly competitive.260 While religious 
institutionalists frequently describe the state as monopolistic and 
unavoidable, the “church,” too, may become so, especially in a market like 
healthcare that is largely local. 
Given the market share of official and unofficial Catholic institutions, 
it is virtually inevitable that a patient will encounter major medical 
institutions with religiously restricted care. Almost one-third of officially 
designated Catholic hospitals serve rural populations.261 Some enjoy “a 
practical, but not state-enforced, monopoly in obstetrical services.”262 Even 
in urban areas, a religiously restricted hospital may be the only provider for 
a large population.263 Especially where public–private partnerships are 
involved, the hospital may be the only option for nonemergency care for 
indigent or uninsured populations.264 
Would-be patients likely do not seek out religiously affiliated hospitals 
even where competitors exist. Patients tend to choose hospitals based 
primarily on where their physicians practice, a choice more reflective of 
geography than religion.265 Insurance plans often constrain patients’ 
options266 and can be expected to continue to do so as the Affordable Care 
Act’s exchange plans adopt narrow networks of providers.267 
 
 260 David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1964, 1966 (2013). 
 261 CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., supra note 31, at 2; see also UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra 
note 16, at 1 (“There are 46 Catholic-restricted hospitals that are the sole community providers of short-
term acute hospital care for people living in their geographic regions.”). 
 262 Ham v. Holy Rosary Hosp., 529 P.2d 361, 365 (Mont. 1974); Patricia Donovan, Hospital Mergers 
and Reproductive Health Care, 28 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 281, 281 (1996) (noting that the merger of 
Leonard Hospital and St. Mary’s Hospital in Troy, New York, resulted in discontinuation of reproductive 
services for “financially and medically needy population in a three-county, largely rural area”); Fogel & 
Rivera, supra note 72, at 725–26 (discussing the impact on women in rural Gilroy, California, of the 
purchase of the sole community hospital by Catholic Healthcare West). 
 263 See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 77 (observing that a for-profit secular hospital bound by religious 
restrictions was “the only hospital in a large area of Chicago”). 
 264 Rob Boston, Emergency! How a City-Owned Hospital in Florida Wound Up Operating Under 
the Catholic Bishops’ Control and What Americans United and Its Allies are Doing About It, CHURCH & 
ST. (Oct. 2000), https://www.au.org/church-state/october-2000-church-state/featured/emergency 
[https://perma.cc/5S33-TLL3] (alleging that following the city hospital’s participation in a consortium 
with a Catholic hospital, a woman whose sonogram revealed that her fetus had no bladder or kidneys and 
severely under-developed lungs was refused an abortion and had to carry to term a fetus that survived for 
thirty minutes). 
 265 Debra B. Stulberg et al., Tubal Ligation in Catholic Hospitals: A Qualitative Study of Ob–Gyns’ 
Experiences, 90 CONTRACEPTION 422, 427 (2014). 
 266 Id. at 426 (reporting that a plaintiff’s insurance plan covered only the local Catholic hospital, 
requiring her to wait to switch insurers and undergo a second surgery rather than receive a tubal ligation 
following her delivery). 
 267 See, e.g., John Geyman, High Deductibles and Narrow Networks: The Achilles Heel of the ACA’s 
Health Insurance, HUFFINGTON POST (published Dec. 22, 2015, 1:43 PM; updated Dec. 22, 2016), 
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Moreover, public polling shows that women do not expect even 
Catholic-designated hospitals to refuse care for religious reasons; the 
majority anticipates finding a full range of reproductive health services 
regardless of religious affiliation, and 45% believe they would be able to 
obtain medical services that go against Catholic religious teachings.268 A 
smaller study found that a majority of women “expected that their 
gynecologist would provide the range of family planning care surveyed” 
regardless of the religious or secular nature of the institution: “[o]ver 90% of 
participants expected to receive short- and long-acting reversible 
contraceptive methods” at a Catholic facility.269 
As hospitals merge and affiliate with one another, potential patients or 
employees may not even recognize that a facility is religiously affiliated.270 
Catholic restrictions must be followed in “St. Luke’s Episcopal Health 
System” and “Jewish Hospital.”271 While hospitals linked to the Catholic 
Church through sponsorship agreements appear on official rosters of 
Catholic hospitals, hospitals that comply with restrictions through 
partnerships or following sales go unidentified. Once sold to a secular buyer, 
formerly Catholic hospitals may no longer retain any outward sign of 
religiosity. Across categories of institutions (whether officially religiously 
designated or zombie hospitals), hospitals do not advertise the services they 
do not provide. Yet the vast majority of women want to know this 
information.272 Determining whether a hospital (or physicians’ group or other 
facility) adheres to religious doctrine proves no easy feat, even for the most 
informed observers of religious healthcare. 
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-geyman/high-deductibles-and-narr_b_8862762.html 
[https://perma.cc/RKR6-5UCD] (“Narrow networks have become endemic under the ACA . . . .”). 
 268 BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, RELIGION, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND ACCESS TO 
SERVICES: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF WOMEN 1 (2000) (produced for Catholics for a Free Choice), 
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
2000religionreproductivehealthandaccesstoservices-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/53U4-7WNP]. 
 269 Maryam Guiahi et al., Are Women Aware of Religious Restrictions on Reproductive Health at 
Catholic Hospitals? A Survey of Women’s Expectations and Preferences for Family Planning Care, 
90 CONTRACEPTION 429, 431 (2014). 
 270 St. Thomas Health Renaming Baptist, Other Hospitals, WSMV (published Jul. 11, 2013, 5:20 
AM; updated July 25, 2013, 5:20 AM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/22812676/st-thomas-expected-to-
rename [https://perma.cc/VR44-47TF] (reporting on the renaming of Baptist Hospital to Saint Thomas 
Midtown because, after 11 years, “most people don’t know the systems are affiliated”). Other rebranded 
hospitals include Middle Tennessee Medical Center, Hickman Community Hospital, and the Hospital for 
Spinal Surgery. 
 271 UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 8. 
 272 Lori R. Freedman et al., Religious Hospital Policies on Reproductive Care: What Do Patients 
Want to Know?, 218 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 251.e1, 251.e1 (2017) (reporting that 80.7% of 
women want to know about religious restrictions on care). 
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Concerns over the creation of monopolies, lack of voluntarism, and 
absence of transparency and choice exist even with regard to officially 
designated Catholic hospitals. But when institutions adopt religion for 
commercial gain, countervailing values of institutional exemption—such as 
the religious liberty of any particular individuals or the autonomy of any 
identifiable church—are absent. 
D. The End of Religious Exemption in Commerce? 
The spread of religion in commerce poses a crisis for the religious 
institutionalism that seemed triumphant post-Hosanna Tabor. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby began to expose the cracks in 
the foundation of religious institutionalism. In that case, a multibillion-
dollar, for-profit corporation with tens of thousands of employees gained a 
right to the free exercise of religion and, indeed, to exemption from 
otherwise-applicable laws under RFRA, equal to other religious 
institutions.273 Dismissing the possibility that religious identity might spread 
through the corporate world, the Court opined that “the idea that unrelated 
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of 
stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the same religious 
beliefs seems improbable.”274 The healthcare industry shows that the Court 
was mistaken. 
Through contract, for-profit and nonprofit, commercial and 
noncommercial, and sacred and secular institutions can become newly 
religious. Defined so broadly, the religious institution seems to lose whatever 
special character it once had. Several proponents of robust institutional 
exemptions have themselves begun to warn that “the expansion of autonomy 
to include for-profits threatens to dilute the entire doctrine, which could 
result in the loss of protections for churches on core matters of identity and 
mission.”275 Across institutions, courts may renounce their historical 
disengagement from definitional questions with regard to religion. They may 
inquire more deeply into the character of institutions and limit constitutional 
and statutory exemptions. 
As the category of religious institution broadens, traditional doctrinal 
deference to claims of religion comes under strain. As a matter of black letter 
 
 273 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 274 Id. at 2774. 
 275 Carmella, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 199, at 381; see also Robinson, supra note 199, at 231 
(“If judges are forced to choose between letting everyone in a broad institutional category have sovereign 
rights or no one, they will inevitably choose no one.”); Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 258, 
at 387 (“[T]he legitimate public policy concerns raised by for-profit businesses as free exercise claimants 
could diminish protections for all free exercise claimants, including churches, unless sensible distinctions 
based on corporate form are drawn.”). 
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law, the Establishment Clause prohibits “excessive entanglement” between 
the government and religious actors.276 Courts thus refrain from resolving 
doctrinal controversies and interfering in ecclesiastical disputes.277 The 
Supreme Court has deferred, for example, to authorities of hierarchical 
churches in particular as to the proper ownership of church property, 
leadership, and administration.278 Several judges have suggested that even 
distinguishing between secular and religious activities or products might 
result in extensive entanglement of government in religious affairs.279 This 
“Establishment Clause Creep,” as Professors Michael Helfand and Barak 
Richman call it, has meant “a growing tendency by courts to interpret the 
Establishment Clause expansively to preclude adjudication of co-religionist 
disputes that, at their core, are commercial in nature.”280 
The case study of healthcare provides additional evidence of such creep. 
In evaluating ERISA church plans, a number of lower courts refused to 
inquire into the religious identity of healthcare systems, including those that 
bring together religious and nonreligious hospitals.281 Inquiring further into 
religious convictions, one court said, would “run afoul of the First 
Amendment” and require courts to “delve into the doctrinal particulars of 
Catholic orthodoxy.”282 When employees disputed the designation of 
Ascension’s pension as a church plan given its lack of control by the Catholic 
Church and its for-profit ventures, another district court decided that its 
consideration of this argument was “prohibited by the Constitution.”283 The 
 
 276 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971). 
 277 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 n.8 (1976) (“Civil judges 
obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the ‘law’ that governs 
ecclesiastical disputes . . . .”); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) (“It is not to 
be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious 
faith of [church] bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”). 
 278  Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 697–98, 710 (noting that deference to church decisions over property 
“appl[y] with equal force to church disputes over church polity and church administration”); Watson, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724–27. 
 279 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[D]etermining whether an activity 
is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This results in considerable ongoing 
government entanglement in religious affairs.”); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 730 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (indicating that any test of religious exemption under Title VII that “take[s] into account the 
‘religious’ or ‘secular’ nature of a particular product or service” would mean “venturing into this 
constitutional minefield”). 
 280 Helfand & Richman, supra note 12, at 776; see also Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 912 (2009) (“In many—and perhaps an increasing number of—instances, 
religion overlaps with the commercial sphere and courts are obligated to determine whether or not to 
adopt an entirely hands-off approach simply because the specter of religion lurks on the horizon.”). 
 281 See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1203 (D. Colo. 2015). 
 282 Id. at 1202. 
 283 Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
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court invoked the autonomy-based arguments of religious institutionalists, 
saying that “[t]he First Amendment creates a protected zone for churches to 
decide these issues of religious doctrine free from government intrusion.”284 
Out of fear of entanglement, courts also have disregarded the conflicts 
that institutions with dual religious identities create.285 In Medina v. Catholic 
Health Initiatives, for example, a fifty–fifty joint venture between Catholic 
and Adventist Health Systems was granted a church plan exemption on the 
basis of the venture’s association with the Catholic Church.286 One religion 
subsumed the other. The court proved unwilling to inquire into religiosity 
even though the institution had a dual-faith identity. 
While courts cannot resolve questions of religious doctrine,287 they also 
hesitate to inquire into the importance of belief to a religion. They rarely 
examine plaintiffs’ sincerity or consistency outside of the context of 
prisoners’ demands for exemption.288 For example, with regard to RFRA, 
which requires that plaintiffs have a sincere religious belief and that their 
free exercise be substantially burdened in order to shift the burden of proof 
to the government, courts may simply defer to plaintiffs. Indeed, after Hobby 
Lobby, courts may have to accept a plaintiff’s assertion that a law 
substantially burdens its religion—ultimately permitting a religious objector 
to subject regulation to strict scrutiny based on its word alone.289 
Having endorsed this hands-off approach from courts (and legislatures), 
religious institutionalists should be wary of widening the category of 
religious institution. Extended beyond houses of worship, the category of 
religious institutions becomes unstable. As Professor Zoë Robinson 
observes, when borderline institutions gain the same footing as core religious 
institutions, “the purposes for the special recognition of religious institutions 
under the First Amendment become blurred.”290 In turn, the incapacity of 
 
 284 Id. 
 285 Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(concluding that a hospital was entitled to the ministerial exception under the Constitution in part because 
two churches of different faith traditions nominated the board of directors and had to approve changes to 
the articles of association). 
 286 Medina, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. 
 287 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not 
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker 
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”). 
 288 Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847–52 (1998) (discussing “The Origin of a ‘Hands-Off’ Approach”). 
 289 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (finding the contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial burden on 
the plaintiffs’ beliefs in part because “the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the 
religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable)”). 
 290 Robinson, supra note 199, at 231. 
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civil authorities to intervene—whether framed as institutional sovereignty or 
hands-off doctrine—“begins to look significantly more troubling.”291 
Today, courts might rethink deferring to a religious institution (or to the 
Church) on the issue of religious identity. As this Article demonstrates, some 
hospitals have disaffiliated with the Vatican but remain sponsored by an 
order of women religious.292 Others have been acquired by institutional for-
profit investors but retain their official Catholic designation.293 Others are 
acknowledged to be secular but nonetheless are bound to follow Catholic 
doctrine.294 Granting these institutions statutory license or constitutional 
autonomy to avoid the state’s power undermines other societal goals and 
constitutional constraints. 
ERISA litigation provides some evidence that courts will reject the 
hands-off approach and narrow the exemption when institutions overreach. 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, explicitly rejected the hands-off argument 
of a healthcare system that sought to set up church plans independent of 
churches. Dignity Health had argued that “the determination whether an 
organization qualifies as a church requires a forbidden inquiry into matters 
of religious doctrine,” barred by the Establishment Clause.295 The Ninth 
Circuit firmly disagreed.296 It further concluded that, regardless of whether a 
church’s organizational form is a matter of “internal church decision,” 
ERISA’s church plan exemption permits any church the freedom to “operate 
their agencies under the same organizational structure as their churches” or 
to separate them.297 In other words, a church can organize so as to make its 
associated entities eligible for church plan status. Having failed to do so, 
however, it could not then claim exemption. 
Lower federal courts recently have become wary of the effects of 
religious institutionalism in commerce in the ERISA context. In the past, 
they tended to avoid constitutional questions by interpreting the statute to 
require that only a church, as opposed to an affiliated hospital, could 
establish a church plan—an approach the Supreme Court brought to a halt in 
2017. For example, the Seventh Circuit rejected the church plan status of a 
healthcare system employing over 33,000 people and affiliated with both the 
 
 291 Hill, supra note 184, at 1198. 
 292 See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 293 See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 294 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 295 Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 912 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, Advocate 
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 296 Id. (stating that “such a determination does not require this sort of inquiry”). 
 297 Id. 
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United Church of Christ and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.298 
The court observed that the system “wishes to push the meaning of the 
exemption to include more organizations, and many more at that,” contrary 
to ERISA’s central goal of “protect[ing] workers who have invested their 
retirement savings into employer-run financial plans.”299 A district court in a 
similar case observed that allowing any tax-exempt organization to 
“establish its own pension plan, maintain it, and then employ the church plan 
exemption by purporting to be controlled by or associated with a church” 
would create a slippery slope, contrary to Congress’s goal of promoting 
workers’ interests.300 As another district court said, this “suggested 
interpretation would reflect a perfect example of an exception swallowing 
the rule.”301 
However, in 2017, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions in 
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton.302 Justice Elena Kagan, writing 
for a unanimous Court, concluded that ERISA does authorize entities other 
than churches to establish church plans.303 Plans established by “hospitals 
themselves—not by a church,” could qualify for exemption from ERISA’s 
requirements.304 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred to express concern over such a 
wide-ranging religious exemption. She wrote, “[T]he Court holds that scores 
of employees—who work for organizations that look and operate much like 
secular businesses—potentially might be denied ERISA’s protections.”305 In 
particular, she said, the multibillion-dollar corporations operating for-profit 
subsidiaries and competing with secular companies “bear little resemblance” 
to the church-related entities that Congress considered in enacting the current 
church plan definition.306 
Given the Court’s acceptance of a broadly defined exemption for 
churches and their associates, the pressure will build to circumscribe the 
category of entities adequately “associated” with churches so as to qualify 
for ERISA exemption. Recall that ERISA requires an “association” with a 
church, focusing on whether an entity shares “common religious bonds and 
 
 298 Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517, 520–21, 532 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 299 Id. at 526. 
 300 Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at *6 
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014). 
 301 Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp. 3d 909, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 302 137 S. Ct. at 1657, 1663. 
 303 Id. at 1656. 
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 305 Id. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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convictions with that church.”307 Courts are likely to be called upon to 
examine hospitals’ ties to churches more closely.308 Similarly, as Justice 
Sotomayor suggested, courts might interpret ERISA so as to exclude plans 
operated by hospital benefits committees on the ground that they are not 
principal-purpose organizations.309 
As contract undercuts the rationales for exemption (or the specialness 
of religion), legislatures, regulators, and courts may police the category of 
religious institution. They might, for example, prohibit contracts that 
continue religious identity. Alternatively, presented with claims of entities 
remote from the core church, courts may scrutinize religious claims more 
closely and engage with the meaning of “religion” directly. Expanding 
religious rights in commerce ultimately may result in less autonomy for all 
institutions—from churches to charitable organizations to for-profit 
corporations.310 
Insofar as legislative or regulatory definitions of religious institutions 
are problematic, policymakers may more carefully circumscribe statutory 
definitions. For example, Maine grants an exemption to a “religious 
corporation, association or organization” from employment, housing, and 
education antidiscrimination law but excludes “[a]ny for-profit organization 
owned, controlled or operated by a religious association or corporation.”311 
Faced with the prospect of religious for-profit entities, legislators may 
impose an explicit requirement of nonprofit or charitable status. 
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Courts likewise might narrowly define religious organization for 
statutory and constitutional purposes. They might look for “pervasively 
sectarian” institutions.312 They could consider whether the primary purpose 
of the institution is the advancement of religious values or whether its 
“primary activity . . . consists of voluntary gathering for prayer and religious 
learning.”313 The membership of the institution and its capacity to affect 
nonmembers also could prove relevant. 
These strategies may require description of a religious institution, 
identification of religious pursuits, or definition of religion itself.314 Defining 
religious institutions—while precarious—likely involves no more 
entanglement than arises when courts consider who is a minister for the 
purposes of the ministerial exception.315 As Professor Kent Greenawalt has 
argued, courts must “sometimes decide whether a claim, activity, 
organization, purpose, or classification is religious.”316 The Hobby Lobby 
Court seems to invite such inquiry. Courts now must adjudicate whether any 
particular for-profit corporation is sufficiently “religious” to exercise 
religion under RFRA.317 
To the extent that contract drives expansion of exemption, lawmakers 
could place limits on the duration or scope of religious contract terms. 
California, for example, recently prohibited the practice of binding new and 
future owners to religious doctrine.318 A hospital, once sold, may not retain 
its religious identity. Similarly, as religious organizations claim a right under 
RFRA to require contracting parties (such as insurance companies) to abide 
by their own religious tenets (as with regard to contraception), limitations 
may be in order.319 Professor Laycock, for example, proposes courts adopt a 
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come dangerously close.”). 
 315 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring 
in order denying rehearing en banc) (“Religions vary drastically in their hierarchical and organizational 
structure, and it is often a tricky business to distinguish spiritual from administrative officials and clergy 
from congregation. The very invocation of the ministerial exception requires us to engage in entanglement 
with a vengeance.”). 
 316 Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept, supra note 314, at 753. 
 317 See Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340–43 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 318 CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917.5 (West 2003). 
 319 See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014) (claiming that a 
nonprofit organization’s religious convictions forbid it from contracting with companies that will provide 
free coverage for contraceptive services). 
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rule that “[r]eligious objectors are not entitled to exemptions for secular 
entities they deal with at arm’s length.”320 
These proposals highlight the interrelationship between exemption and 
contract. California’s statute, for example, resolves the problem of zombie 
religious hospitals but fails to confront the dilemma of second-order affiliate 
institutions. Once religious commercial institutions are granted an 
exemption, contract inevitably plays a role in defining the contours of the 
institution. Limiting particular contracts does not tell us where, assuming a 
fixed core, the institution’s boundaries lie. 
As long as exemptions operate in a commercial space and have value, 
the problem of contracting religion and zombie religious institutions 
remains. For example, if nonprofit status proved determinative for 
exemption, for-profit hospitals—whether Catholic- or investor-owned—
would not qualify as religious institutions. In this regard, the category of 
religious institution would be clear. But nominally secular nonprofit and 
public partners of Catholic healthcare still might become eligible for 
religious exemption through an affiliation agreement. And formerly Catholic 
nonprofit hospitals with no ties to the Church also would seem to be exempt. 
Once commercial entities are eligible for exemption as religious institutions, 
thwarting the diffusion of religion through the market proves difficult. 
Exemption still can extend to affiliates and zombie institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of the healthcare market destabilizes the theory that 
religious institutionalism fosters pluralism and nourishes individual free 
exercise. By contracting religion, institutions affiliated with other faiths and 
investors devoted to profit assume a religious mantle. And religious identity 
survives in zombie form. Exemption becomes the rule, and “religious 
institution” loses its meaning. 
With corporations claiming religious goals in commercial pursuits from 
craft retail to riflescope manufacture to car sales, the pressure on institutional 
exemptions is likely to increase proportionally. Employees and consumers 
often have little choice but to encounter religious healthcare institutions. 
People who hold different or no religious beliefs thus become subject to 
religious restrictions. The example of ERISA church plans demonstrates that 
religious exemptions (and objections) are not limited to so-called culture war 
issues, such as contraception and abortion. Institutional carve-outs can affect 
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costly worker-protective regulations—ranging from antidiscrimination 
obligations to pension protections. 
Contracting religion—and the distinct problems it creates for law and 
theory—may extend beyond the healthcare industry. An array of nonprofit 
parachurch organizations has sprung up.321 Some such entities lack formal 
financial or hierarchical ties to an established religious body or church.322 
Like healthcare facilities, they often offer goods and services in competition 
with secular or for-profit entities. Well-established churches increasingly 
depart from the nonprofit charitable model in investing in commercial 
entities.323 For-profit corporations unaffiliated with any church seek to join 
religion and commerce in a variety of sectors.324 As religion and profit 
combine across industries, contracts may spread religious compliance and 
identity. Zombie religious institutions may emerge across the marketplace. 
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